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“Nothing is more basic to the criminal process than the right of 
the accused to a trial by an impartial jury. The presumption of 
innocence, the prosecutor’s heavy burden of proving guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and the other protections afforded the accused 
at trial are of little value unless those who are called to decide the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence are free of bias.”1 
 
“The use of peremptory challenges contributes to the historical 
and ongoing underrepresentation of minority groups on juries, 
imposes substantial administrative costs, results in less effective 
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 1. People v. Branch, 389 N.E.2d 467, 469 (N.Y. 1979). 




juries, and unfairly amplifies resource disparity among litigants—
all without substantiated benefits. The peremptory challenge is an 
antiquated procedure that should no longer be used.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
The American jury has generated boundless dissertations about its 
history, purpose, structure, and continuing vitality. The Louisiana Law 
Review’s 2020 Symposium contributes significantly to this literature, 
addressing historical perspectives on the jury, the jury as a political and 
cultural institution, and standards in criminal and civil jury trials.3 I was 
honored to participate on a panel exploring the topic of jury impartiality 
in criminal cases.4 
The American criminal jury is unique in the world by virtue of this 
country’s commitment to lay jurors from the local community wielding 
final authority over whether the state may exercise its power to punish.5 
The criminal law system ’s expectation that these lay jurors will be 
“impartial” reflects not only an interest in decision-making fairness and 
accuracy, but also the fact that jurors decide cases in an adversarial system 
of dispute resolution. In criminal trials in particular, defense lawyers and 
prosecutors know that their zealous advocacy to the lay jury is what stands 
between the defendant and the state’s desire to punish. Thus, the jurors 
 
 2. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 348 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., 
concurring). 
 3. See Symposium Objective and Purpose, LSU LAW, https://www.law. 
lsu.edu/symposium/ [https://perma.cc/6D4T-2QGH] (last visited May 1, 2020).  
 4. See Schedule, LSU LAW, https://www.law.lsu.edu/symposium/schedule/ 
[https://perma.cc/5RW3-AUFK] (last visited May 1, 2020). 
 5. See generally Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (recognizing 
an “essential feature” in the lay jury of interposing the “commonsense judgment 
of a group of laymen” between the defendant and prosecution, and the 
“community participation and shared responsibility which results from that 
group’s determination of guilt or innocence”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
156 (1968) (affirming that the jury trial right “reflect[s] a fundamental decision 
about the exercise of official power—a reluctance to entrust plenary power over 
the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or a group of judges”). The 
uniqueness of this lay-jury system extends to specific doctrine, such as largely 
unimpeachable general verdicts and jury nullification. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 
606(b); Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017) (noting that 
“[s]ome version of the no-impeachment rule is followed in every State and the 
District of Columbia”); State v. Ragland, 519 A.2d 1361, 1372 (N.J. 1986) 
(observing that “[j]ury nullification is an unfortunate but unavoidable power” of 
the jury). 




must be ready to receive the lawyers’ partisan advocacy from arm ’s length, 
with an open mind.6 This combination—partisan legal advocacy directed 
to an impartial audience of lay jurors—forms the heart of the American 
criminal jury trial. Indeed, for experienced trial lawyers, once the 
metaphorical pugilist bell rings to start a jury trial, the mindset narrows to 
“game on,”7 with near tunnel vision on the jurors who will decide the 
outcome.8 
Several features of the federal and state constitutions, statutes, and 
court rules contribute to juror  “impartiality.”9 The focus of this Article, 
however, is on the intersection of anti-bias norms and zealous advocacy in 
the selection of “impartial” jurors.10 This intersection reveals a recurring 
and so far intractable11 dichotomy of bias in jury selection. On the one 
 
 6. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
 7. Brooks Holland, Anticipatory Self-Defense Claims as a Lens for 
Reexamining Zealous Advocacy and Anti-Bias Disciplinary Norms, 49 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 89, 117 (2016). 
 8. This narrowing of professional focus with the commencement of jury trial 
is implicitly reinforced by several Rules of Professional Conduct. See MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶¶ 2, 8, 9; r. 1.1–.3, 3.1–.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1980). 
 9. The law has not achieved a comprehensive understanding of impartiality 
in practice. See Richard Loren Jolly, The New Impartial Jury Mandate, 117 MICH. 
L. REV. 713, 724 (2019) (commenting that “[c]ourts have struggled to advance a 
cohesive definition of impartiality that can reflect the jury’s competing 
responsibilities”). The jury system, however, seeks juror impartiality early in the 
jury selection process with the fair cross-section requirement. See Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 187 (1986) (connecting fair cross-section requirement to 
jury impartiality); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975). How a trial 
court instructs prospective and sitting jurors also can affect impartiality. See, e.g., 
Unconscious Bias Juror Video, U.S. DIST. CT. W. DIST. WASH., https://www 
.wawd.uscourts.gov/jury/unconscious-bias [https://perma.cc/DY2N-QVQ5] (last 
visited June 1, 2020); Criminal Jury Instruction—Unconscious Bias, U.S. DIST. 
CT. W. DIST. WASH., https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/sites/wawd /files/Criminal 
JuryInstructions-ImplicitBias.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GKP-4RNF] (last visited 
June 1, 2020). The law increasingly has been willing to enforce impartiality post-
verdict to expose racial bias in the deliberation room. See Peña-Rodriguez v. 
Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017); State v. Behre, 44 P.3d 1172 (Wash. 2019); 
see also Jolly, supra, at 740–50. For modernistic takes on jury impartiality, see 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935 
(2016); Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579 (2011). 
 10. For an examination of this intersection of zealous advocacy and anti-bias 
norms in other contexts, see Holland, supra note 7. 
 11. Cf. Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of 
Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 829 (2012) (referring to the 




hand, the U.S. legal system demands an impartial jury as critical to a fair 
trial.12 Juror bias against a party or claim undermines this fundamental 
principle, and no one can discern case-specific biases better than the 
lawyers who have investigated and strategized the parties’ theories of the 
case and who are tasked with proving and arguing that theory directly to 
the jury.13 This jury trial system therefore entrusts the partisan lawyers in 
jury selection to contribute their dedicated mindset to the process of 
identifying and removing jurors who may harbor these biases. Working 
from voir dire, lawyers thus zealously seek and remove juror bias by 
exercising challenges for cause, plus a specified number of peremptory 
challenges.14 
On the other hand, experience demonstrates that these same lawyers 
will deploy their own biases in examining and excluding jurors. Indeed, 
the phenomenon of lawyer bias in jury selection is not a bug but rather a 
feature of the system, because the jury selection process is all about bias—
bias against jurors who may harbor prejudices against a party or claim, and 
bias in favor of jurors who may be receptive to that party or claim. But 
sometimes lawyer bias manifests as racial bias, sex or gender bias, or other 
invidious biases that violate the rights of jurors to serve their community 
free from discrimination. History is replete with the discriminatory 
exclusion of jurors based on race or sex,15 and the peremptory challenge 
 
“intractable . . . challenge of creating a fair process for the selection of fair 
jurors”). 
 12. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing right in any criminal 
prosecution to “trial, by an impartial jury”); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 
668 (1987) (observing that “the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very 
integrity of the legal system”); People v. Branch, 389 N.E.2d 467, 469 (N.Y. 
1979) (opining that “[n]othing is more basic to the criminal process than the right 
of the accused to a trial by an impartial jury”); cf. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. 
v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984) (recognizing jury impartiality in civil cases). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See Paul Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 911, 918–21 (1997) (observing “our county’s sad history of 
excluding black people from juries”); cf. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 
1418–19 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (describing the non-unanimous jury 
verdict rule as “‘the last of Louisiana’s Jim Crow laws’”); id. at 1411 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (noting “legacy” of racial discrimination in Louisiana and Oregon 
jury systems, and that “the States’ legislatures never truly grappled with the laws’ 
sordid history”); Peña-Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) 
(detailing history of racial discrimination in jury system). 




has become the primary vehicle for this practice.16 Modern jury selection 
practices may only be making this dynamic worse. As trial courts 
increasingly economize voir dire, which is the main source for transparent, 
evidence-based challenges to jurors, lawyers must turn more and more to 
opaque peremptory challenges and intuition to identify and strike biased 
jurors. The U.S. Supreme Court established a regime for regulating 
discriminatory peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky,17 but Batson 
has not succeeded in effectively regulating discriminatory peremptory 
challenges, leading some courts and commentators to call for eliminating 
peremptory challenges.18 
A bias dichotomy results: zealous lawyers are an important safeguard 
against juror bias in criminal trials, yet our concern over lawyer bias may 
lead us to eliminate one of the legal safeguards against juror bias—the 
peremptory challenge. Both sides of this bias dichotomy implicate critical 
concerns for a just jury trial system, yet the status quo has become 
inadequate.  
This Article will argue that this bias dichotomy may be resolved 
without resorting to zero-sum choices, such as the elimination of 
peremptory challenges. In particular, a novel experiment taking place in 
the State of Washington to reform the Batson test merits attention and 
 
 16. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103–05 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (reviewing discriminatory history of the peremptory challenge); 
Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1620 
(2018) (reviewing history of racial discrimination in jury selection and noting shift 
to use of peremptory challenge as a principal tool after about 1935). 
 17. Batson, 476 U.S. 79. 
 18. See, e.g., State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467, 481 (Wash. 2018) (Yu, J., 
concurring) (observing that “I . . . remain convinced that nothing short of 
complete abolishment of the peremptory challenge . . . will get us on the right path 
toward finally eradicating racial bias in jury selection”); State v. Erickson, 398 
P.3d 1124, 1134 (Wash. 2017) (Yu, J., concurring) (calling “for the complete 
abolishment of peremptory challenges”); State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 348 
(Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) (concluding that “it is time to abolish 
peremptory challenges”); see also State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 340 (Iowa 
2019) (Cady, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he solution in the future is to do away with 
the peremptory challenge.”); id. (Wiggins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The only way to stop the misuse of peremptory challenges is to abolish 
them.”); People v. Brown, 769 N.E.2d 1266, 1273 (N.Y. 2002) (Kaye, C.J., 
concurring) (“My nearly 16-year experience with Batson persuades me that, if 
peremptories are not entirely eliminated (as some have urged), they should be 
very significantly reduced.”); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten 
Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1182–83 (1995) (arguing that 
“[p]eremptory challenges should be eliminated”). 




further study as a vehicle for confronting, and hopefully mitigating, the 
bias dichotomy in jury selection. Developed as a court rule, Washington 
Supreme Court General Rule 37 (GR 37)19 materially alters the standards 
and procedures of the Batson rule to give judicial review of peremptory 
challenges the teeth it needs to minimize the vices of those challenges 
without altogether denying their virtues to litigants, especially criminal 
defendants. This Article will position GR 37 as a potential model for 
confronting the bias dichotomy in jurisdictions that are unsatisfied with 
the status quo in jury selection, yet seek to reform rather than to eliminate 
the peremptory challenge as an important feature of that process. 
Part I of this Article will present the bias dichotomy in jury selection, 
pitting lawyer bias against juror bias. In defining this bias dichotomy, this 
section will explore three critical features to the selection of an impartial 
jury: (1) zealous advocacy from lawyers; (2) challenges for cause; and (3) 
peremptory challenges. Part II will explore the failings of the Batson 
regime in regulating the lawyer-bias side of this dichotomy, resulting in 
calls to eliminate the peremptory challenge, such as those in recent 
opinions by some justices of the Washington Supreme Court that have 
garnered national attention.20 Responding to these calls to eliminate the 
peremptory challenge, Part III will defend these challenges as necessary 
to address the competing concern for juror bias and to realize other values 
of the jury trial system. This argument will not seek to diminish the valid 
concerns about peremptory challenges. Rather, the argument will reinforce 
the virtues of the peremptory challenge as a reason to continue to seek non-
binary solutions to the bias dichotomy. Examining one such potential 
solution, Part IV will review Washington ’s GR 37 as an effort to re-
balance these interests, so that lawyers can confront rather than succumb 
to the bias dichotomy in jury selection. The Article will close with some 
forward-looking observations about GR 37. 
In addressing this bias dichotomy thesis, this Article will implicitly 
accept certain premises that permeate the paper and thus should be 
acknowledged. First, this paper often will examine the bias dichotomy 
through the lens of criminal defense values, with the assumption that these 
perspectives will track symmetrically for prosecutors and civil lawyers, as 
they typically do under the Batson regime.21 The bias dichotomy, however, 
 
 19. GR 37 is available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/pdf/GR/ 
GA_GR_37_00_00.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QMP-TKC2]. 
 20. See infra notes 84–138.  
 21. See Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (holding that racially discriminatory peremptory 
challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause); Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 
42 (1992) (applying Batson rule to peremptory challenges by the defense); 
Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (applying Batson rule 




may scale quite differently for civil litigants and especially for prosecutors. 
Prosecutors and some civil litigants may not face the same concerns over 
juror bias as criminal defendants, nor might society have the same interests 
in regulating bias by lawyers against criminal defendants.22 In particular, 
the State and its prosecutorial agents have a unique responsibility to 
represent the entire community.23 Yet, the State and its agents also own a 
unique legacy of deploying the peremptory challenge discriminatorily as 
part of a racist criminal law system.24 
Thus, if this paper’s reflections and prescriptions for criminal 
defendants do not seem as good of a fit for civil litigators or prosecutors, 
the ideal arrangement might be to adopt asymmetrical rules for peremptory 
challenges between prosecutors, criminal defendants, and civil litigants.25 
 
to peremptory challenges by civil litigants); cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, 
J., concurring) (arguing against disparate peremptory challenge rights between 
prosecution and defense, because “[o]ur criminal justice system ‘requires not only 
freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against 
his prosecution’”). 
 22. See Holland, supra note 7, at 104–09. For the view that discriminatory 
peremptory challenges by the defense cause at least two of the three principal 
harms that arise from discriminatory peremptory challenges by prosecutors, see 
Audrey M. Fried, Protecting Jurors from the Use of Race-Based Peremptory 
Challenges by Defense Counsel, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1320–22 (1997) 
(identifying harm to jurors and to the integrity of the criminal justice system). 
 23. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1980) (noting that “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice 
and not simply that of an advocate”); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
78, 88 (1935) (famously holding “[t]he United States Attorney is the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern 
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done”); State v. Walker, 341 P.3d 976, 984 
(Wash. 2015) (noting that a prosecutor’s “advocacy has its limits,” and thus a 
prosecutor has the duty to ‘subdue courtroom zeal,’ not to add to it, in order to 
ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial”). 
 24. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103–05 (Marshall, J., concurring); Frampton, 
supra note 16, at 1600–20. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM 
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012). 
 25. Some jury selection rules do implicitly recognize asymmetrical interests 
in jury impartiality by apportioning fewer peremptory challenges to the 
prosecution. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2) (providing that in felony cases, 
the prosecution will have six peremptory challenges but the defense ten); see also 
David B. Rottman & Shauna M. Strickland, State Court Organization 2004, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8XZZ-APB7] (reporting that 42 states, the District of Columbia, and 




If, however, the law continues to track symmetrically in this area between 
these three groups, then the law should be calibrated to the criminal 
defendant, whose unique, individual constitutional interests in both juror 
impartiality and zealous advocacy bring the bias dichotomy to its apex. 
Reforms should not resolve this bias dichotomy through uniform solutions 
that may fit the interests and responsibilities of the prosecutor or even the 
civil litigant unless they also fit the criminal defendant’s distinct interests 
and responsibilities. 
Second, this Article will work from the premise that the lay jury 
system in the United States remains a desirable practice that we should 
maintain.26 Of course, many other legal systems boast effective criminal 
adjudication that does not rely entirely on lay jurors, or on lay jurors at 
all.27 Moreover, the criminal law system in the United States is in truth a 
world of plea bargaining more than a world of jury trials.28 As a result, 
 
Puerto Rico afford equal number of peremptory challenges to the defense and 
prosecution, and eight states provides the defense with more). Civil parties 
typically have fewer peremptory challenges than parties to a criminal case. See, 
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2018) (providing only three peremptory challenges to each 
party in a civil case). One scholar has argued that symmetrical peremptory 
challenges between the prosecution and defense violates the Constitution. See 
Brittany L. Deitch, The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Jury Selection, 26 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1059 (2018). 
 26. Of course, historically, the lay jury in the United States has not been a 
static legal creature, but essential features have remained constant. See Josh 
Bowers, Democratization and the Restoration of Moral Judgment: Upside-Down 
Juries, 11 NW. U. L. REV. 1655, 1663 (2017) (noting that “even though jury 
practice has evolved significantly since the Founding, our aspirations for the 
institution have remained largely unchanged”). 
 27. See, e.g., Ingram Weber, The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering 
the Public, Preserving Continental Justice, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 125, 126 (2009) 
(reporting that “[b]eginning in 2009, Japan will introduce juries into criminal 
trials,” in which “[m]ixed panels of lay assessors and professional judges will hear 
serious criminal cases and jointly determine guilt and sentences”); Renée Lettow 
Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an American 
Murder in the French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 800–01 (2001) 
(reviewing French Court d’assises mixed-jury system for serious crimes, and 
Tribunal correctional non-jury system for less serious crimes); Elisabetta Grande, 
Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 228 
(2000) (noting that in the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, criminal cases are 
adjudicated by a “single body of adjudicators—consisting of professional judges, 
that in the most serious cases sit together with lay assessors”). 
 28. “According to data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 
trials accounted for 3.1% of federal convictions in 2008, 2.5% in 2012, and 2.4% 
in 2016. . . . [A]ccording to data from the National Center for State Courts, in 




many criminal cases are not subject to the serious adversarial testing that 
this paper will champion, especially in misdemeanor cases.29 Several 
commentators have proposed other mechanisms for criminal adjudication 
or other entry points for community participation in decision-making in 
criminal cases that could be more robust in the end than a jury trial 
exemplar that is rarely realized.30 Even global events like the COVID-19 
pandemic may demand consideration of new paradigms for adjudicating 
criminal cases.31 
 
2015 the felony trial rates for California, New York, and Texas were 2.3%, 4.0%, 
and 2.1%. Trials are even rarer in misdemeanor cases.” Williams Ortman, Second-
Best Criminal Justice, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1061, 1067, 1070 (2019); cf. Ronald 
F. Wright, Kami Chavis & Gregory Parks, The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury 
Selection as a Political Issue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407, 1421 (2018) (reporting 
that in a study of 100 North Carolina counties “[r]emarkably, the clerks in 10 of 
the 100 counties reported that no jury trials at all occurred in their counties 
between 2011 and 2013”). 
 29. Cf. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2nd 1122, 1124–26 
(W.D. Wash. 2013) (finding that “meet and plead” system for public defense 
representation in two Washington State cities systematically deprived defendants 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because “[a]dversarial testing of the 
government’s case was so infrequent that it was virtually a non-factor in the 
functioning of the Cities’ criminal justice system”); Gerard Lynch, Our 
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2118 
(1998) (arguing that American plea bargaining “as it actually operates in most 
cases looks much more like what common lawyers would describe as a non-
adversarial, administrative system of justice than the adversarial model they 
idealize”). 
 30. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 26, at 1659 (arguing that “we should move 
juries from the trial stage to the stages of arrest, bail, charge, bargain, and 
sentence”); Laura Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 734 (2010) 
(expressing a goal “to restore the community-jury right to the bulk of criminal 
adjudication by envisioning the community’s integration into the guilty plea”). 
 31. See, e.g., Matt Reynolds, Could Zoom jury trials become the norm during 
the coronavirus pandemic?, ABA J. (May 11, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.aba 
journal.com/web/article/could-zoom-jury-trials-become-a-reality-during-the-pan 
demic [https://perma.cc/7WSN-WWEG] (exploring whether traditional jury trial 
practices can be replicated on the Zoom platform); Debra Cassens Weiss, 
Potential jurors questioned via zoom for summary jury trial in Texas, ABA J. 
(May 19, 2020, 10:25 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/potential-
jurors-questioned-via-zoom-for-summary-jury-trial-in-texas [https://perma.cc/96 
D9-P9YQ] (reporting on first potential Zoom civil jury trial, including use of 
Zoom breakout rooms for the traditional practice of lawyers approaching the 
bench for a sidebar). Some courts in other countries are using Zoom for a wide 
range of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., John Geddie, Man sentenced to death in 




For better or worse, the jury trial remains the quintessence of 
American criminal justice, and my experience with jury trials confirms 
their unique value, as well as their inefficiency, relative to other systems.32 
This Article does not seek to refute important discourse about new and 
more efficacious paradigms for criminal adjudication. Instead, this paper 
accepts the premise that the jury trial is the paradigm that the criminal 
justice system has adopted. The jury trial system therefore must confront 
the bias dichotomy that this paradigm presents. 
I. THE BIAS DICHOTOMY 
The bias dichotomy arises with the jury selection process. Mileage 
varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and even from judge to 
judge, on the precise features of the jury selection process. One federal 
judge, however, has effectively captured the essential components of this 
process in just about every courthouse: 
Ordinarily, in civil and criminal cases in both state and federal 
courts, the panel of jurors that decides the case is selected from a 
much larger pool. Voir dire is the process of questioning 
prospective jurors about their qualifications to serve on the jury 
panel to decide the case. The rules of almost all courts, state and 
federal, provide that the questioning of prospective jurors may be 
conducted by the judge, the attorneys for the parties, or both. In 
the course of the questioning, both parties and the court may strike 
potential jurors for cause when the prospective juror’s views 
would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his 
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath.” At 
the conclusion of voir dire the parties are also ordinarily 
authorized to make a certain number of “peremptory challenges” 
to strike jurors without stating a reason for doing so.33 
 
Singapore on Zoom call, REUTERS (May 19, 2020, 11:51 PM), https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-singapore-crime-idUSKBN22W0I6 [https://per ma.cc/XTN 
7-YNXS] (reporting on judicial use of Zoom video platform to impose death 
sentences in Singapore and Nigeria). 
 32. Cf. Rocha v. King Co., 460 P.3d 624 (Wash. 2020) (González, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he benefits of jury service to the court, to the 
community, and to the jurors themselves, would be hard to overstate”). 
 33. Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in 
Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise 
of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 158–59 (2010) 
(internal footnotes omitted); see also Tania Tetlow, Why Batson Misses the Point, 




The jury selection process “is a critical part of trial and ought not to 
be treated as merely a prelude to the main event,”34 because this process 
ensures an impartial jury, which is essential to a fair trial.35 “Yet, despite 
the concept’s centrality, there is little agreement on what makes a jury 
impartial,”36 and “[c]ourts have struggled to advance a cohesive definition 
of impartiality that can reflect the jury’s competing responsibilities.”37 As 
a general matter, the best the law can do is declare that a prospective juror 
lacks impartiality if the juror ’s views would “prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.”38  
Notably, this standard of impartiality does not present a pure question 
of law for judges to decide. Rather, this question of juror competency is 
highly fact specific to the individual juror,39 drawing on the many norms 
and values of the U.S. lay jury system, such as accuracy, legitimacy, 
fairness, and inclusiveness, all empowering a voice of community justice 
 
97 IOWA L. REV. 1713, 1715–16 (2012) (summarizing jury selection process); see, 
e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24; FED. R. CIV. P. 47; WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.4 
(2020); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.05–.55 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 34. In re Pers. Restraint of Meredith, 422 P.3d 458, 467 (Wash. 2018) (Yu., 
J., concurring). 
 35. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (observing that “the 
impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system”); 
People v. Branch, 389 N.E.2d 467, 469 (N.Y. 1979) (“Nothing is more basic to 
the criminal process than the right of the accused to a trial by an impartial jury.”); 
cf. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981); Ristaino v. Ross, 
424 U.S. 589, 594–95 (1976) (identifying relationship between voir dire and the 
State’s constitutional “obligation to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury”). 
 36. Jolly, supra note 9, at 714. 
 37. Id. at 724. 
 38. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 
448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980)); see, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(b) 
(permitting challenge for cause if the prospective juror “has a state of mind that is 
likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the 
evidence adduced at the trial”). Jurisdictions also provide for various statutory 
disqualifications for jurors who, for example, are related to a party or lack other 
qualifications, such as residency in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. § 270.20(1)(a), 
270.20(1)(c). An interesting, recent case in Colorado nevertheless upheld a 
defendant’s conviction even though the trial judge’s own spouse served on the 
jury and the judge made numerous comments about their relationship during the 
trial. See Richardson v. People, No. 18SC686, 2020 WL 2829847 (Colo. June 1, 
2020). 
 39. See United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1226 (1986) (quoting 
Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (noting that “[j]ury competence is 
an individual rather than a group or class matter”)). 




that operates independently of the state, including the judiciary.40 
Impartiality cannot be simplified into a convenient formula that limits the 
jury’s ability to dispense independent community justice. 
This jury system, therefore, does not entrust judges alone to determine 
jury impartiality as an objective legal equation reserved to judicial 
expertise. Rather, the system submits this legal question to the rigors of 
adversarial testing by the parties, a process that positions judges to impanel 
a jury whose impartiality that process has validated.41 The adversarial 
 
 40. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (observing that “[j]ury 
service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the rights of the 
parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people”); 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (recognizing that “the essential 
feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his 
accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the 
community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s 
determination of guilt or innocence”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) 
(reviewing values underlying jury trial right); cf. Rocha v. King Co., 460 P.3d 624 
(Wash. 2020) (González, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “[t]he benefits of jury 
service to the court, to the community, and to the jurors themselves, would be 
hard to overstate,” and drawing specific values from Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America); cf. Wright, Chavis & Parks, supra note 28, at 1431–32 (“Jury service 
creates a forum for popular participation in criminal justice.”); Paul Butler, 
Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 
105 YALE L.J. 677, 709–12 (1995) (arguing role of jury to counter “democratic 
domination” by racial and political majorities against minority communities); 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 205, 205 (1989) (noting potential superiority of deliberative jury to single 
judge because of the jury’s “ability to reflect the perspectives, experiences, and 
values of the ordinary people in the community—not just the common or typical 
perspective, but the whole range of viewpoints”); cf. Frampton, supra note 16, at 
1620–21 (identifying various rationales for the jury system and importance of 
inclusion). This notion of the independent jury might be quite foreign to, and 
incongruous with, an inquisitorial legal system. See Lerner, supra note 27, at 814–
17 (observing that in the French mixed-jury system, “[p]rofessional judges and 
lay jurors are treated more as colleagues and collaborators than as independent 
forces”). 
 41. Some observers would argue that this process does little to validate juror 
impartiality, and rather “often demean[s] jurors in actual practice.” Lerner, supra 
note 27, at 816; see also id. at 814, 816 (observing that jurors in France “are 
treated with respect. The parties are not allowed to pick them over with a fine-
tooth comb; voir dire is brief and remarkably unintrusive,” and jurors thus are 
treated “as if they were responsible human beings with serious duties”). True that 
the United States jury system does often impose more bureaucratic inefficiencies 
on jurors as a group, and the voir dire process itself can be more intrusive to 




process is rarely perfect in this validation, but the adversarial jury system 
relies on this same process in other analogous contexts to validate answers 
to partly normative legal questions. For example, in rejecting the 
constitutionality of judges admitting testimonial hearsay without cross-
examination of the declarant on grounds that the testimony satisfies a legal 
test for reliability, the Supreme Court declared:  
Admitting statements deemed to be reliable by a judge is 
fundamentally at odds with the right to confrontation. To be sure, 
the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure the reliability of evidence, 
but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It 
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination. . . . Dispensing with confrontation because testimony 
is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a 
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth 
Amendment prescribes.42 
For jury selection, one easily could substitute the term “impartial juror” in 
this adversarial constitutional equation for any of the Court’s references to 
reliable witnesses. 
A jury trial is where a lawyer ’s zealous advocacy naturally reaches its 
adversarial zenith. The jury trial system does not tolerate this behavior 
from lawyers simply because of the stakes and rigors of the jury trial. On 
the contrary, one expects zealous advocacy from the parties to ensure that 
the jury trial system functions according to adversarial norms: 
As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under 
the rules of the adversary system. . . . A lawyer’s responsibilities 
as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a 
public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing 
party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on 
 
individual jurors. I am, however, not so certain that those experiences are 
necessarily disrespectful or demeaning to jurors. On the contrary, having tried 
dozens of criminal cases myself, my experience is that this process can reinforce, 
albeit laboriously sometimes, that each individual juror is unique and central to 
this important task. I rarely have observed jurors once selected not approach their 
task with individual seriousness and integrity, perhaps a product of the message 
conveyed by robust and individualized jury selection practices. 
 42. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004); see also id. at 62 
(quoting M. HALE, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 
258 (1713)) (“[A]dversarial testing ‘beats and bolts out the Truth much better.’”) 
(emphasis added). 




behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being 
done.43 
Zealous advocacy holds a special currency for criminal defense 
lawyers once a jury trial commences. Numerous commentators have 
observed that “the case for undiluted partisanship is most compelling” in 
criminal defense.44 This case for partisan advocacy has virtuous roots, as 
the duty of zealous advocacy has been associated with “autonomy, 
individual rights, a need to curb excesses by the state, client satisfaction, 
and the achievement of a substantively just result.”45 The Rules of 
Professional Conduct themselves recognize the unique advocacy role of 
defense counsel in the adjudication of a criminal case, exempting defense 
counsel from the general prohibition on frivolous claims and defenses. A 
criminal defense lawyer may “defend the proceeding as to require that 
every element of the case be established.”46 For these reasons, the law has 
embraced the following model of criminal defense advocacy, despite 
understandable critique: 
[D]efense counsel has no . . . obligation to ascertain or present the 
truth. Our system assigns him a different mission. He must be and 
 
 43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶¶ 2, 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1980); see also id. at Preamble ¶ 9 (including “the lawyer’s obligation zealously 
to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests” as a basic principle underlying 
the Model Rules). Not all jurisdictions are enamored of the term “zealous 
advocacy.” See, e.g., WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶¶ 2, 7, 8; r. 
3.1 cmt. 1 (2006) (substituting “conscientious and ardent” advocacy for references 
to “zealous” advocacy). 
 44. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 589, 605 (1985); see also Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous 
Representation—Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical 
Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 775 (2006) (defending a robust model of 
client-centered advocacy when a lawyer represents a client in a criminal matter, 
because “the criminal defense lawyer is the client’s lone champion against a 
hostile world”). 
 45. Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1169 
(2006); see also Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1319 (2006) (exploring the history of, and defending, the ethical 
norm of zealous advocacy). But cf. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, 
Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 66–67 (2005) 
(exploring another potential dichotomy, between traditional zealous advocacy and 
advocacy with “emphasis on personal conscience and discretion,” and instead 
suggesting “a third conception of advocacy ethics,” drawing on notions of 
“professional conscience”). 
 46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 




is interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, but, 
absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his 
client whether he is innocent or guilty. . . . Defense counsel need 
present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. . . . Our 
interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the 
State to its proof, to put the State’s case in the worst possible light, 
regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth. . . . In this 
respect . . . we countenance or require conduct which in many 
instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth.47 
This duty of zealous advocacy certainly extends to jury selection.48 
Impartiality is the goal for jurors, but not for the lawyers themselves, and 
most certainly not for criminal defense counsel. On the contrary, defense 
attorneys must approach jury selection with their knowledge of the client 
centrally in mind, while also anticipating the theory of the case, the 
witnesses and evidence, and the multitude of biases against the client that 
prospective jurors may bring with them into the courtroom. As a scholar 
of criminal defense advocacy observed, “It is hard enough for a criminal 
defendant standing trial; there are enough wrongful assumptions, 
prejudices, and hostilities directed toward the criminally accused. When 
one factors in that most criminal defendants are poor and 
disproportionately nonwhite, the situation is that much worse.”49 
For the lawyer, therefore, none of this jury-selection exercise is neutral 
or objective. A lawyer may approach jury selection with the goal of 
 
 47. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256–58 (1967) (White, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal footnotes omitted). Of course, 
in Wade, Justice White, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, embraced this 
partisan model of criminal defense advocacy as a reason why defense counsel 
should have no right to participate in an investigative lineup, even post-charge. 
See id. at 258–59. 
 48. See Abbe Smith, “Nice Work if You Can Get It”: “Ethical” Jury 
Selection in Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 533, 565 (1998) 
(arguing that “[i]f a message can be gleaned from most of the scholarship and 
commentary on criminal defense, it is that jury selection is critical to the outcome 
of a criminal trial and, in this, as in all things, the client comes first and everything 
and everyone else be damned”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 49. Id. at 565; cf. Christian B. Sundquist, Uncovering Juror Racial Bias, 96 
DENV. L. REV. 309, 314 (2019) (summarizing data about racial bias in the criminal 
law system, including that “African-American men receive federal prison 
sentences nearly 20% longer than white men for similar convictions,” African-
Americans comprise 38% of the prison population “despite constituting only 13% 
of the overall population,” and the United States “‘imprisons a larger percentage 
of its black population than South Africa did at the height of apartheid’”). 




producing an impartial jury by seeking individual jurors who lack or can 
address their own explicit or implicit biases, who can relate to the client as 
a member of a shared community, who will be open-minded to the client ’s 
factual and legal claims, and who bring appropriate skepticism to the 
State’s claim and hold it to the burden of proof.50 To the partisan lawyer’s 
mind, everyone else can take a hike. Moreover, the lawyer knows that a 
more diverse jury may deliberate more meaningfully and accurately51 and 
can better fulfill its role as an independent community check on 
governmental power.52 Finally, the lawyer in a criminal case knows that 
the requirement of a unanimous verdict raises the stakes that even one 
rogue juror can defeat a verdict that the party otherwise might secure—
guilty or not guilty.53 These client-centric biases of the lawyer in selecting 
a jury are not only unavoidable in, but central to, the adversarial system.54 
This biased perspective of lawyers of course does not determine who 
sits on the jury. Rather, this biased view of the parties provides the judge 
with critical, case-specific insight for setting the scope of necessary voir 
dire and for evaluating challenges for cause.55 The lawyers’ advocacy thus 
 
 50. Cf. Smith, supra note 48, at 565. 
 51. Cf. Sarah E. Gaither et al., Mere Membership in Racially Diverse Groups 
Reduces Conformity, 9 SOC. PSYCH. & PERS. SCI. 402, 403 (2017) (observing that 
diversity on a jury can counteract bias by white jurors by heightening their sense 
of membership in a diverse group); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and 
Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on 
Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006) (seminal study 
finding that diverse juries examined more facts of the case, evaluated the evidence 
more deeply, deliberated longer, made fewer erroneous statements, and overall 
performed better than homogeneous control juries); cf. State v. Saintcalle, 309 
P.3d 326, 337 (Wash. 2013) (reviewing studies and concluding that “[t]hese 
studies confirm what seems obvious from reflection: more diverse juries result in 
fairer trials”). 
 52. Cf. Ellsworth, supra note 40, at 205 (noting diverse juries’ “ability to 
reflect the perspectives, experiences, and values of the ordinary people in the 
community—not just the common or typical perspective, but the whole range of 
viewpoints”). 
 53. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405–08 (2020) (requiring 
unanimous verdicts under the Sixth Amendment); cf. id. at 1427 n.94 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (observing that “when unanimity is demanded, the work of preventing 
[a rogue juror from preventing a verdict] must be done in large measure by more 
extensive voir dire and more aggressive use of challenges for cause and 
peremptory challenges”). 
 54. See Smith, supra note 48 (embracing client-centered zealous advocacy). 
 55. Cf. Bennett, supra note 33, at 150, 160 (observing that “[f]or a variety of 
reasons, judges are in a weaker position than lawyers to anticipate implicit biases 




reveals safe zones of juror impartiality to the judge through party 
agreement on the scope of voir dire and on individual juror qualifications. 
The advocacy also sharpens disputes over impartiality when a party makes 
or requests case-specific inquiries of jurors, or when that information 
animates challenges to whether a juror may, in fact, be biased. This 
advocacy, importantly, is always a two-way street in the adversarial 
system. Opposing counsel, therefore, can be quite active in using the voir 
dire process to contextualize or counter the other party’s claim that a 
prospective juror is biased.56 In this way, the adversarial system depends 
on bias from competent and diligent lawyers to investigate and reveal, and 
also to counter and resolve, concerns over potential juror bias. 
This adversarial process initially informs the challenge-for-cause 
system through which the parties have a right to remove biased jurors.57 
These challenges, however, are often inadequate to the full task of 
ensuring an impartial jury.58 The legal standard of removal for cause is 
high,59 and “[t]rial judges have much discretion in conducting voir dire and 
 
in jurors and determine how those biases might affect the case,” including the fact 
that the “lawyers almost always know the case better than the trial judge”). 
 56. Juror “rehabilitation,” for example, is a common tactic for experienced 
trial lawyers and judges to retain jurors who have expressed bias. See, e.g., Patrick 
T. Barone & Michael B. Skinner, Breaking the Spell of the Magic Question 
During Voir Dire, 39 CHAMPION 22 (2015) (examining judicial rehabilitation of 
jurors, and arguing that “[i]mproper rehabilitation always corrupts the jury trial 
process, but it prejudices criminal defendants much more often than the 
prosecution because there is a stronger initial bias against them. Either way, 
however, the result is the same—a corruption of the solemn right to a trial by an 
impartial jury”); Connie Henderson, Your Honor, Stop Screwing Up My Voir 
Dire!, WARRIOR, at 42, 43 (Winter 2016), available at https://www.triallawyers 
college.org/media/5164/henderson_connie_voirdire.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VSM 
-UMBX] (discussing the “evils of juror rehabilitation” by trial judges, and 
exploring advocate strategies to counter it after exposing juror bias). For a study 
on the effectiveness of judicial rehabilitation of jurors, see Caroline B. Crocker & 
Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of Rehabilitative Voir Dire on Juror Bias and 
Decision Making, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 212 (2010). 
 57. See sources cited supra note 33.  
 58. Jolly, supra note 9. 
 59. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (requiring challenge 
for cause when a prospective juror’s state of mind would “prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions 
and oath”); see, e.g., United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1225–27 (1986) 
(rejecting that jurors’ membership in the National Rifle Association and other 
anti-gun control organizations implicitly demonstrated bias in a criminal case 
involving implementation of gun control statutes).  




identifying and striking unqualified jurors.”60 Casebooks are replete with 
examples of judges denying the defendant a challenge for cause with a 
juror who expressed reservations about being impartial because the juror 
promised to follow judicial instructions or to be fair.61 These sanitizing 
“expurgatory oaths”62 offered by jurors may follow active rehabilitation of 
the challenged juror by the prosecutor or even the trial judge.63 
 
 60. Jolly, supra note 9, at 736; see Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 
(1984) (noting “special deference” afforded to trial judge’s determination of juror 
credibility and demeanor); State v. Holliday, No. 2017-KA-01921, 2020 WL 
500475, at *14–18 (La. Jan. 29, 2020) (noting broad discretion for trial court to 
determine scope of void dire and rule on challenges for cause). 
 61. See C.J. Williams, To Tell You the Truth, Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 24(c) Should be Amended to Permit Attorneys to Conduct Voir Dire of 
Prospective Jurors, 67 S.C. L. REV. 35, 44 n.67 (2015) (observing that 
“[p]rospective jurors often assert they can be fair and impartial, despite their 
beliefs, and that is generally sufficient to defeat challenges for cause,” and 
collecting cases). 
 62. See People v. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d 846, 850–51 (N.Y. 2000) (explaining 
that “a juror who has revealed doubt, because of prior knowledge or opinion, 
about her ability to serve impartially must be excused unless the juror states 
unequivocally on the record that she can be fair. While the [law] does not require 
any particular expurgatory oath or ‘talismanic’ words . . . jurors must clearly 
express that any prior experiences or opinions that reveal the potential for bias 
will not prevent them from reaching an impartial verdict”); People v. Harris, 689 
N.Y.S.2d 598, 598 (App. Term 1998) (observing that “[w]here a prospective juror 
reveals knowledge or expresses an opinion that creates a doubt regarding his or 
her ability or willingness to judge the case impartially and solely upon the 
evidence admitted at trial, the juror must be excused, unless the juror is willing to 
state unequivocally that prior knowledge or opinion will not influence his or her 
verdict and that it will be rendered impartially, solely upon the evidence. This is 
sometimes called an ‘expurgatory oath’”). 
 63. A common example from my experience might proceed as follows, 
perhaps following voir dire by the trial judge on the defendant’s presumption of 
innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proof: 
Lawyer: Juror X, your response indicated you may have some 
reservations about presuming my client is innocent when the prosecution 
has accused him of a crime. That’s understandable. But despite those 
reservations, can you promise my client that you will presume this 
accusation is wrong and he is innocent, and will not convict him unless 
the district attorney proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? 
Juror X: I’m not sure I can. Your client’s been charged with a serious 
crime. That wouldn’t happen for no reason. I feel like your client should 
say something if he is innocent.  
Lawyer: Thank you, Juror X.  




Alternatively, the trial judge may simply restrict the allotted time and 
questions in voir dire so that the lawyer cannot develop an adequate record 
for a challenge for cause except for a few jurors.64 Voir dire also depends 
heavily on an honor system for jurors responding to questions from judges 
and lawyers. The challenge-for-cause system thus fails to address juror 
biases that a juror is unwilling to disclose,65 especially to a judicial officer 
in a formal court proceeding.66 
Beyond these limitations in addressing explicit juror bias, the 
challenge-for-cause standard is deficient by design in its ability to detect 
implicit juror biases—those biases that a juror holds unconsciously that 
 
Court: Well, Juror X, let me ask you this question: If I instruct you that 
the law requires you to presume the defendant’s innocence unless and 
until the State proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, will you 
follow my instructions?  
Juror X: Oh, yes, Your Honor, of course I will. 
Whatever the accuracy of this juror’s response to the judge’s question, this juror 
likely no longer could be struck for cause. The defense lawyer nevertheless retains 
legitimate reasons to question whether this juror will be impartial toward her 
client in serving as a check on governmental power. 
 64. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 844–45; Bennett, supra note 33, at 160–61 
(both examining the reluctance of some jurors to respond candidly to judicial 
questions about their biases, or to respond at all, when a candid response may be 
viewed as socially undesirable or as disappointing the judge). 
 65. I have suspected this potential dynamic many times during jury selection. 
For example, in a case I tried in the Bronx in the 1990s, my client was charged 
with attempted murder of four Bronx police officers in a shootout that followed 
an alleged taxicab robbery. A prospective juror during one round of voir dire was 
a police officer from another Bronx precinct. During voir dire, the prosecutor 
asked the officer, “Can you be fair to the defendant and keep an open mind even 
though she is accused of trying to murder other police officers?” The officer 
replied without hesitation, “I absolutely can.” The prosecutor followed up, “Will 
you give the police witnesses any special weight because they are police 
officers?” “No,” the officer responded, “I will treat all the witnesses the same.” 
Call me a skeptic, but I did not buy it. Nor did my client. But I also could not 
eliminate this seemingly likely juror bias with a challenge for cause unless I could 
persuade the judge that the officer was not credible in his responses. I was not 
successful. 
 66. Bennett, supra note 33, at 160; Roberts, supra note 11, at 844–46 
(exploring reasons why jurors may not disclose explicit biases during voir dire); 
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 
1675 (1985) (explaining that “jurors would naturally be reluctant to admit 
[discriminatory views], particularly since they know that social disapproval will 
be publicly expressed by dismissing them from the venire”). 




may affect the juror’s judgment and decisions.67 These undisclosed, 
implicit biases, which fall wholly outside the scope of a challenge for 
cause, often include race, gender, or other invidious biases.68 These 
undisclosed biases, although largely invisible to judicial review, can be 
critical to a criminal defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial.69 One scholar 
recently found that “racial disparities pervade the exercise of challenges 
for cause,” with little judicial oversight.70 
For these reasons, the law in every jurisdiction affords criminal 
defendants and other parties a specified number of peremptory 
challenges.71 A party need not offer any reason for a peremptory 
challenge.72 The goal of the peremptory challenge is for parties to bring 
their case-specific knowledge and interests to bear on a limited number of 
prospective jurors who may be biased but who fall below the radar of a 
challenge for cause.73 The Constitution does not provide a right to 
 
 67. “Implicit social cognition is a branch of psychology that studies how 
mental processes that occur outside of awareness and that operate without 
conscious control can affect judgments about and behaviors toward social 
groups.” L. Song Richardson & Phillip A. Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public 
Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2629 (2013). See State v. Saintcalle, 309 
P.3d 326, 353 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) (noting that “[j]urors 
sometimes conceal or are ignorant of their own biases”); Roberts, supra note 11, 
at 829 (observing that “[c]urrent doctrine fails to address the fact that jurors harbor 
not only explicit, or conscious bias, but also implicit, or unconscious bias”); 
Bennett, supra note 33, at 151–60 (exploring the science of implicit bias, and 
concluding that “judge-dominated” voir dire “does not begin to address implicit 
bias, which by its nature is not consciously known to the prospective juror”). 
 68. See Richardson & Goff, supra note 67, at 2629–31 (explaining 
occurrence, prevalence, and power of implicit racial biases, with sources). 
 69. Roberts, supra note 11; Johnson, supra note 66 (expressing concern for 
these powerful biases evading challenge-for-cause system). 
 70. Thomas Frampton, For Cause: Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the 
American Jury, 118 MICH. L. REV. 785, 788 (2020) (emphasis added). 
 71. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24; WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.4 (2020); 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25(1) (LexisNexis 2020).  
 72. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25(1) (providing that “[a] 
peremptory challenge is an objection to a prospective juror for which no reason 
need be assigned. Upon any peremptory challenge, the court must exclude the 
person challenged from service”). 
 73. See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). One scholar 
has collected four traditional justifications for peremptory challenges:  
First, the peremptory challenge allows the litigants to “eliminate 
extremes of partiality” on the venire. Accordingly, at least in theory, it 
operates to secure for the litigants a fair and impartial jury. Second, it 
gives the parties some control over the jury selection process and thereby 




peremptory challenges,74 and the limited number of these challenges 
requires a lawyer to be strategic in deploying them across the panel of 
prospective jurors. Nevertheless, these challenges afford each party an 
important opportunity: to contribute to jury impartiality that, unlike a 
challenge for cause, is not subject to judicial approval of that party’s 
concerns for impartiality. 
The problem with peremptory challenges, however, is that their 
opacity makes them unaccountable.75 In the influential article The Jim 
Crow Jury,76 Professor Thomas Ward Frampton reviewed why and how 
the peremptory challenge has become a primary tool for racial and other 
invidious discrimination against jurors.77 Working from a robust dataset 
on jury selection practices in Louisiana, Professor Frampton concluded 
that “[p]rosecutors wield both peremptory strikes and for-cause challenges 
to eliminate black jurors at an extraordinarily disproportionate rate, and 
they do so with greater frequency when prosecuting black defendants.”78 
This study further found that prosecutors do not exercise a monopoly on 
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Defense lawyers 
 
enhances the litigants’ confidence in the proceedings and respect for the 
jury’s ultimate verdict. Third, it permits litigants to probe for biases 
during voir dire without fear of alienating a potential juror. Even if no 
grounds for a challenge for cause appear, the litigant can exercise a 
peremptory challenge to exclude a panelist who may have been 
antagonized by the litigant’s questioning. Fourth, it serves as a safety net 
of sorts for those instances when the challenge for cause is wrongly 
denied or cannot be demonstrated, but the litigant still believes that the 
jury panelist harbors bias.  
Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire 
By Questionnaire and the ‘Blind’ Peremptory Challenge, 29 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 981, 985–86 (1996). 
 74. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (holding that 
“[t]here is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the 
Congress to grant peremptory challenges”). 
 75. See Fried, supra note 22, at 1314 (noting that “the unlimited discretion 
historically conferred by peremptory challenges in order to facilitate the selection 
of an impartial jury also provides an opportunity for race and sex discrimination”). 
 76. See Frampton, supra note 16. The United States Supreme Court cited to 
The Jim Crow Jury in Ramos v. Louisiana in invalidating non-unanimous jury 
verdicts under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 
140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).  
 77. See Frampton, supra note 16, at 1620–25. Racial bias, of course, is a 
complex topic that has received much attention in the literature well beyond the 
scope of this paper. See Sundquist, supra note 49, at 335–46 (exploring the 
science of racial bias). 
 78. Frampton, supra note 16, at 1621–22 (internal footnote omitted). 




disproportionately strike white prospective jurors, and even more so when 
representing a black client.79 “The overall equilibrium is not evidence that 
the system is working,” Professor Frampton claimed, but rather “reflects 
systemic, mirror-image violations of both black and white jurors’ 
constitutional rights.”80 Other studies of jury selection reinforce these 
conclusions.81  
Consequently, a critical bias dichotomy surfaces: lawyers better 
minimize jurors’ unfair biases when lawyers have diverse and robust 
advocacy tools for challenging jurors, including the peremptory challenge. 
Yet these same tools, especially the peremptory challenge, can activate 
and empower lawyer biases against otherwise qualified jurors.82 This 
dichotomy presents a necessary choice to decide which bias merits more 
attention from the law: whether the right of a criminal defendant to deploy 
peremptory challenges in seeking an impartial jury outweighs the right of 
jurors to be free from discrimination, or whether jurors’ right to freedom 
from discrimination matters more than the value of the peremptory 
challenge. 
Batson v. Kentucky83 attempted to resolve this choice as a false 
dichotomy by creating a framework for judicial regulation of peremptory 
challenges. The nearly uniform view, however, is that Batson has failed in 
this effort. 
II. THE FAILED BATSON SOLUTION 
Batson recognized the authority of trial judges to regulate peremptory 
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
 79. Id. at 1634–35. 
 80. Id. at 1635. 
 81. See id. at 1624–25 (summarizing other studies); see, e.g., Catherine M. 
Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, Beyond Batson’s Scrutiny: A Preliminary Look at 
Racial Disparities in Prosecutorial Peremptory Strikes Following the Passage of 
the North Carolina Racial Justice Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1623, 1627–28 
(2013) (discussing ongoing empirical research finding that “black qualified jurors 
consistently faced a significantly higher risk of strike [by prosecutors] than all 
other qualified jurors,” and noting convergence other legal and social science 
research confirming “that race continues to play a role in jury selection”). For 
recent examples of this discrimination in action, see, for example, Flowers v. 
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
 82. Cf. Bennett, supra note 33, at 151 (noting value of lawyer advocacy in 
reducing juror bias, but the role of peremptory challenges in empowering the 
biases of lawyers). 
 83. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  




Amendment.84 The Supreme Court grounded this rule in three interrelated 
harms that racially discriminatory peremptory challenges cause: harm to 
the defendant’s fair trial interests, harm to the juror’s equality interests, 
and broader harm to the integrity of the legal system.85 As the Court 
explained, “[R]espect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law 
will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury 
service because of his race.”86 
The Supreme Court subsequently applied the Batson rule to govern 
civil litigants87 and criminal defendants.88 Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has extended Batson to sex discrimination.89 Lower courts have applied 
Batson to other forms of invidious discrimination in jury selection, 
including discrimination against sexual orientation,90 religious 
affiliation,91 and color.92 
This framework suggests a potentially robust opportunity for judicial 
regulation of discriminatory peremptory challenges during jury selection. 
To prevail under Batson, however, the complaining party must pass 
successfully through Batson’s familiar three-stage test: 
First, a [party] must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory 
challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that 
showing has been made, the [responding party] must offer a race-
neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, in light 
of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether 
the [complaining party] has shown purposeful discrimination.93 
 
 84. See id. at 89. 
 85. See id. at 86–87. 
 86. Id. at 99. 
 87. See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (applying 
Batson rule to peremptory challenges by civil litigants). 
 88. See Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (applying Batson rule to 
peremptory challenges by criminal defendants). 
 89. See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (applying Batson to 
gender discrimination). 
 90. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471 
(9th Cir. 2014) (applying Batson to sexual-orientation discrimination). 
 91. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 133 P.3d 1013, 1023–24 (Ca. 2006); see also 
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 269–70 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(collecting lower-court cases). 
 92. See People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611, 613–15 (N.Y. 2016) 
(recognizing skin color as a protected Batson classification in addition to race, 
gender, and ethnicity). 
 93. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 475 (2008). 




This Batson framework has generated what one scholar has 
characterized as “withering criticism”94 of the rule’s ability to 
meaningfully regulate the lawyer side of the bias dichotomy in jury 
selection. The bases for this criticism abound, but it often focuses on five 
concerns, several of which Justice Thurgood Marshall himself anticipated 
in the Batson decision: (1) the requirement of lawyer intent to discriminate 
against the challenged juror is a difficult evidentiary standard to meet in 
the jury selection context95 and does little to nothing to address implicit 
lawyer bias in using peremptory challenges;96 (2) the structure and content 
of Batson’s three-stage test easily permits a guilty lawyer to hide a 
discriminatory strike behind a host of flimsy but legally satisfactory “race 
neutral” reasons for the strike;97 (3) some trial judges may be reluctant to 
acknowledge Batson violations, because the required pretext finding under 
the third stage of analysis implies that the lawyer is a deceptive racist;98 
 
 94. Frampton, supra note 16, at 1623. 
 95. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (observing that “defendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so flagrant as to establish a 
prima facie case”). 
 96. Cf. id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Nor is outright prevarication by 
prosecutors the only danger here. ‘[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to 
himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are legal.’ A prosecutor’s 
own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that 
a prospective black juror is ‘sullen,’ or ‘distant,’ a characterization that would not 
come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically.”) (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted); see also State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 335 (Wash. 2013). 
 97. Cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 105–06 (observing that “[i]f such easily generated 
explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor’s obligation to justify his 
strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court today may 
be illusory”); Wright, Chavis & Parks, supra note 28, at 1413–14 (observing that 
“it is too easy for attorneys to fabricate race-neutral reasons, after the fact, to 
exclude minority jurors”); Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 81, at 1631–32 
(confirming that prosecutor regularly evade Batson with racial neutral 
explanations for discriminatory strikes); Jeffrey Bellin & Juninho P. Semitsu, 
Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or 
Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1090–1105 (2011) 
(reviewing federal Batson decisions from 2000 to 2009). 
 98. See Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 338 (observing that “[a] requirement of 
conscious discrimination is especially disconcerting because it seemingly requires 
judges to accuse attorneys of deceit and racism in order to sustain a Batson 
challenge”); cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (commenting 
that “[a] judge’s own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept [a 
lawyer’s] explanation as well supported”); Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 97, at 
1113. An inference of unethical discrimination from a Batson violation is not 




(4) Batson does not enhance jury diversity, because it embraces a 
“colorblind” ethos;99 and (5) appellate courts defer heavily to the trial 
judge’s resolution of these issues of lawyer credibility.100 The net 
perspective on Batson might be best captured by one law review article’s 
revealing title: Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the 
Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney.101 
These valid critiques of Batson have prompted creative judicial and 
academic proposals to modify and improve the Batson rule.102 The 
intensifying critiques of Batson, however, have also invited renewed calls 
 
necessary as a disciplinary matter. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (providing that “[a] trial judge’s finding that 
peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone 
establish a violation of paragraph (g)”). 
 99. See Tetlow, supra note 33, at 1714–15 (arguing that “Batson does not 
value diversity at all. Instead, Batson held unconstitutional the very idea that race 
and gender predict belief. . . . Batson [thus] actually interferes with the quest for 
jury impartiality”); see also Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 334 (noting that “[a] growing 
body of evidence shows that Batson has done very little to make juries more 
diverse”). 
 100. See Wright, Chavis & Parks, supra note 28, at 1412, 1414 n.6 (observing 
that “appellate courts rarely reverse convictions based on Batson claims”). 
 101. See Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 97. One section heading in this article 
is also colorfully titled, “Jurors are more likely to be struck by lightning than to 
be struck by a violator of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 1102; see also 
Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 81, at 1628 (noting convergence in legal and social 
science literature “that race continues to play a role in jury selection 
notwithstanding Batson’s prohibition”). 
 102. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1131–32 (Wash. 
2017) (adopting “bright-line” rule that “the peremptory strike of a juror who is the 
only member of a cognizable racial group on a jury panel constitutes a prima facie 
showing of racial motivation” under Batson). For several academic proposals to 
reform Batson standards or procedures, see, for example, Bellin & Semitsu, supra 
note 97, at 1106–09 (summarizing proposals); Roberts, supra note 11, at 873–74 
(implicit bias testing); Jen C. Griebat, Peremptory Challenge by Blind 
Questionnaire: The Most Practical Solutions for Ending the Problem of 
Racialized Discrimination in Kansas Courts While Preserving the Necessary 
Function of the Peremptory Challenge, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323, 337–38 
(2003) (proposing blind questioning system for jury selection); Brian W. Stoltz, 
Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge: Letting Lawyers Enforce the Principles of 
Batson, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1047 (2007) (proposing peremptory “block” 
system by lawyers); Montoya, supra note 73, at 1115–25 (proposing voir dire 
questionnaire with blind peremptory challenges). 




to eliminate the peremptory challenge.103 One of the most compelling calls 
was delivered by Washington Supreme Court Justice Steven González in 
his influential concurring opinion to that court’s decision in State v. 
Saintcalle.104 This Article, therefore, will explore Justice González’s 
opinion as an exemplar of the strongest critiques of the peremptory 
challenge under the Batson regime. 
In Saintcalle, the Washington Supreme Court majority recognized the 
many shortcomings of the Batson rule in regulating lawyer bias: “‘[T]he 
fact of racial and ethnic disproportionality in [Washington’s] criminal 
justice system is indisputable.’”105 The court noted, however, that “[a] 
growing body of evidence shows that Batson has done very little to make 
juries more diverse or prevent prosecutors from exercising race-based 
challenges.”106 To illustrate, the court acknowledged that “[in] over 40 
cases since Batson, Washington appellate courts have never reversed a 
conviction based on a trial court’s erroneous denial of a Batson 
challenge.”107 The court also lamented that Batson does not reach the 
prevalent dynamic of “unconscious prejudice and implicit bias.”108 
Nevertheless, the court was reluctant to decide whether and how to reform 
Batson in a litigated case in which the parties had not briefed the issue.109 
 
 103. See cases cited supra note 18. These calls are not entirely new. Justice 
Thurgood Marshall himself called to abolish the peremptory challenge in Batson 
itself. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision 
today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-
selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory 
challenges entirely.”). In Batson, the Supreme Court was addressing peremptory 
challenges by the prosecution. Nevertheless, Justice Marshall further observed, 
“The potential for racial prejudice, further, inheres in the defendant’s challenge 
as well. If the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge could be eliminated only at the 
cost of eliminating the defendant’s challenge as well, I do not think that would be 
too great a price to pay.” Id. at 108. Interestingly, in the recent Supreme Court 
decision invalidating non-unanimous verdicts under the Sixth Amendment, 
Justice Kavanaugh analogized non-unanimous jury verdict rules to discriminatory 
peremptory challenges. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414–18 (2020) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (noting, after reviewing the racist history of 
Louisiana and Oregon’s non-unanimous jury verdict rule, that “[i]n effect, the 
non-unanimous jury allows backdoor and unreviewable peremptory strikes 
against up to 2 of the 12 jurors”). 
 104. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326 (Wash. 2013). 
 105. Id. at 334. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 335. 
 109. Id. at 337. 




Accordingly, the court deferred the question to a future case or even the 
court’s administrative rule-making process.110 
Justice González was less enamored of waiting than the majority.111 
Instead, Justice González argued that the court had a duty to “ensure that 
none of our trial procedures propagate injustice.”112 In detailing the ways 
in which peremptory challenges propagate injustice, Justice González first 
situated the peremptory challenge historically in a process where 
challenges for cause “remain[] the primary method by which we ensure 
impartial juries,”113 juror impartiality means an ability to “follow 
instructions on the law,”114 and trial judges have significant discretion in 
evaluating whether a juror is impartial.115 Justice González thus framed the 
peremptory challenge as a historical supplement.116 
In Justice González’s view, this supplement in practice no longer 
fulfills its purpose of enhancing jury impartiality.117 Instead, lawyers 
“simply use peremptory challenges to remove the prospective jurors they 
perceive to be least favorable to their position, regardless of whether such 
prospective jurors possess biases so severe as to render their participation 
unfair.”118 The goal is to maximize juror “favoritism,” especially in “close 
cases.”119 Justice Gonźalez questioned whether an empirical basis even 
supports this partisan effort by lawyers. Instead, drawing on several 
sources of methods of trial practice, Justice González concluded that 
lawyers’ peremptory-challenge strategies “all rely heavily on stereotypes 
and generalizations” and “superficial judgments, notwithstanding the fact 
that whatever directly relevant information is available either provides no 
indication that the prospective juror is unqualified or provides some 
indication that is only fairly debatable at best.”120 Empirical studies 
indicate that lawyers, even when guided by jury selection experts, are not 
particularly effective, “even for the adversarial purpose of excluding 
unfavorable jurors.”121 
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This dynamic unsurprisingly prompts some lawyers to rely on racial 
and other invidious biases as a shortcut. Justice González identified several 
types of explicit and implicit racial bias that can inform lawyer intuition 
in striking jurors: (1) “straightforward, race-based stereotype or 
generalization”;122 (2) “a simple or complex statistical juror profile that 
incorporates race as an indicator of favorability”;123 (3) “a desire to obtain 
a particular racial dynamic on the jury as a whole”;124 and (4) “unconscious 
racial bias.”125 Justice González concluded that these racial biases are 
widespread and “occurring regularly” in jury selection.126 This conclusion 
was reinforced with several studies,127 including a survey of Washington 
lawyers that revealed that “42.6 percent of surveyed lawyers reported that 
prosecutors in Washington either ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ use peremptory 
challenges to systematically exclude minorities from juries.”128 
Batson, Justice González concluded, “cannot effectively combat the 
widespread racial discrimination that underlies the use of peremptory 
challenges throughout this state, and thus, such racial discrimination will 
 
 122. Id. at 355. 
 123. Id. at 356. 
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 125. Id. This catalogue of racial biases that apparently are impermissible in 
jury selection implies a fairly “colorblind” theory of juror impartiality. This theory 
does hold some jurisprudential currency. Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop 
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the Court purports to solve the problem of endemic jury discrimination 
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any presumption that justice might turn on race. Because it would prove 
too ‘divisive’ to recognize the proven realities of jury discrimination, the 
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lawyers selecting the jury. 
Tetlow, supra note 33, at 1714 (internal footnotes omitted); cf. Wright, Chavis & 
Parks, supra note 28, at 1430 (empirical study finding that “juries with more white 
men were more likely to convict, particularly when the defendant was a black 
man. Thus, it is easy to see why defense attorneys might want to save more of 
their peremptory challenges for white male jurors”). 
 126. See Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 356–57 (González, J., concurring). 
 127. See id. at 356–58. 
 128. Id. at 357–58. 




continue unabated.”129 Peremptory challenges thus cause numerous harms: 
the strikes perpetuate the “underrepresentation of minority groups on 
juries,”130 impose “substantial administrative and litigation costs,”131 
produce “less effective and less productive” juries,132 and “amplif[y] 
underlying resource disparity among litigants in a way that brings 
fundamental fairness into question.”133 
Justice González acknowledged that “peremptory challenges are not 
always harmful or pernicious.”134 However, in Justice González’s view, 
“trial and appellate courts cannot reliably identify which particular 
challenges involve racial discrimination and which do not.”135 
Accordingly, Justice González concluded, “Abolishing peremptory 
challenges is constitutionally required, given the need to prevent racial 
discrimination and the lack of any justification for allowing peremptory 
challenges.”136 Alternatively, Justice González noted, “If we do not 
abolish peremptory challenges, we should at least take steps to augment 
the effectiveness of the current jury selection process under Batson.”137 
Justice González’s Saintcalle opinion has justifiably been influential, 
including on the Washington Supreme Court itself.138 This opinion also 
has garnered attention from jurists and academics around the country, 
prompting renewed assessment of whether the time has arrived to 
eliminate the peremptory challenge from the lexicon of jury selection.139 
Despite the compelling rationales proffered by Justice González and other 
critics, the record may not yet justify eliminating the peremptory challenge 
altogether, at least if criminal defense peremptories are to be buried in the 
same casket with prosecution peremptories. 
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III. A CAUTIOUS DEFENSE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
In responding to critiques of the peremptory challenge, this Article 
will not repeat well-established rationales that have been explored 
elsewhere.140 Nor, in the face of Saintcalle’s persuasive knocks against the 
peremptory challenge, will this Article offer much of a defense for 
prosecution peremptory strikes. The prosecution already may come into 
jury selection benefitting from juror biases trending more in its favor.141 
Moreover, the state carries a continuing legacy of racial discrimination in 
almost every facet of its criminal law system, including in the peremptory 
challenge, operating as a system of oppression and control against racial 
minorities.142 Not a great equation for lauding the peremptory challenge’s 
value in the face of compelling critiques of this practice. 
A criminal defendant, by contrast, stands in a distinct position as the 
very object of the state’s desire to punish and control. Consequently, a 
zero-sum solution to the bias dichotomy, such as the abolition of 
peremptory challenges, may cause distinct harm. These harms should be 
weighed carefully before the same party seeking to punish a criminal 
defendant can strip the defendant of such a well-established tool to assure 
an unbiased jury will hear the State’s accusation. While Justice González 
persuasively demonstrates in Saintcalle the many vices of this jury 
selection tool, even when used by criminal defendants, those vices may 
not operate “without substantiated benefits.”143 
To be clear, I am not advocating for special license for criminal 
defense lawyers to discriminate against jurors on the basis of race, sex, 
sexual orientation, gender identity, color, or other protected classification. 
Criminal defense lawyers are trained to fight against these biases, not to 
exacerbate them, and the rules of ethics quite properly subject all lawyers 
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to this limit on zealous advocacy.144 I, therefore, agree that “[r]acial 
discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors offends the dignity 
of persons and the integrity of the courts.”145  
By eliminating the peremptory challenge, however, the law would 
impose a prophylactic solution to the bias dichotomy that would eliminate 
non-discriminatory peremptory challenges along with discriminatory 
challenges.146 Yet, this proposal adds nothing new to lawyers’ advocacy 
toolkit for identifying and removing harmful juror biases that can unfairly 
skew outcomes.147 Lawyers will rely on judge-determined challenges for 
cause, yet as one experienced jurist has observed:  
Because lawyers almost always know the case better than the trial 
judge, lawyers are in the best position to determine how explicit 
and implicit biases among potential jurors might affect the 
outcome. . . . [T]he trial judge is probably the person in the 
courtroom least able to discover implicit bias by questioning 
jurors.148  
To illustrate in even more practical terms: while the judge is 
evaluating whether jurors can be generally impartial in a sexual assault 
case, the defense lawyer is evaluating whether the jurors will respond 
fairly and critically to the anticipated cross-examination of the victim and 
will listen fairly to the client’s testimony, including cross-examination. 
The current challenge-for-cause system cannot realistically capture these 
juror biases.149 A decision to eliminate peremptory challenges, therefore, 
 
 144. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.6 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 4th ed. 2017) (providing ethical duty for defense counsel to refrain from 
invidious bias, to eliminate those biases, and to detect, investigate, and eliminate 
“historically persistent biases like race, in all of counsel’s work”). 
 145. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 332–33. 
 146. See id. at 348 (acknowledging that “peremptory challenges are not always 
harmful or pernicious”). 
 147. See Sundquist, supra note 49, at 345 (noting that “racial bias on the jury 
has long been found to be clearly associated with distorted trial outcomes,” and 
even “can exert a causal effect on trial outcomes in some cases,” and especially 
can “impact decision-making with regard to guilt and the interpretation of 
ambiguous evidence”). 
 148. Bennett, supra note 33, at 160; Williams, supra note 61, at 61 (observing 
that “a trial judge will not know the case at the bar anywhere near as well as the 
lawyers trying the case”). 
 149. See Bennett, supra note 33, at 159–61. 




may codify only that lawyers “worry more about discrimination against 
jurors than about discrimination by jurors.”150 
Justice González appears to hold a skeptical view, however, of the 
goal of peremptory challenges and their value to juror impartiality: 
[A]ttorneys use peremptory challenges to exclude unfavorable 
jurors, not to obtain an impartial jury. Peremptory challenges are 
used to remove prospective jurors who are qualified but who the 
attorney believes will be relatively unfavorable in what is 
probably a close case. That has nothing to do with furthering 
impartiality in our justice system.151 
Even if this perspective is accurate in some cases, we should be clear 
about who unilaterally will decide juror qualifications and select the jury 
if lawyers have no peremptory challenges. Judges would pick the juries, 
as the selection of all trial jurors would depend entirely on challenges for 
cause, which depend on judicial permission. 
Judges in criminal cases are agents of the same State that is also 
prosecuting the defendant.152 Judges may have a different role than 
prosecutors, and judges and prosecutors may not feel like they are on the 
same team some days. Judges, however, are state actors nevertheless.153 
For example, the judge will enter a guilty verdict from the jury to give that 
condemnation the force of law, and the judge will finalize the judgment 
by imposing a sentence.154 Many judges run for public election, and 
oftentimes these elections can include the typical themes of “criminal 
justice” for the public’s safety.155 Other judges are appointed by an 
 
 150. Tetlow, supra note 33, at 1715 (emphasis added). 
 151. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 363 (González, J., concurring). 
 152. This fact is precisely why the Supreme Court concluded that a defense 
peremptory challenge satisfies the state-action requirement for an equal protection 
violation against the removed juror. See Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 42, 51–
55 (1992). 
 153. See id. 
 154. See Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609 (1973) (noting that 
“‘[f]inal judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the 
judgment.’ . . . In the legal sense, a prosecution terminates only when sentence is 
imposed”). 
 155. See Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on 
Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 328 (2010) (observing 
that “the tough-on-crime message, or some derivation thereof, is among the most, 
if not the most, prevalent in judicial campaigns,” and that “[i]n one study of the 
2000 judicial elections in four states . . . crime control or cracking down on 
criminals was the most frequent theme in televised causing advertisements”). A 




executive officer who occupies the same branch of government as the 
prosecutor seeking to convict the defendant.156 Eliminating the peremptory 
challenge thus would prevent defendants from having any say in their jury 
of peers, unless the defendant wins permission from a state actor. 
In the United States criminal law system, with its legacy of state-
sanctioned discrimination and mass incarceration of marginalized 
persons,157 I maintain significant concerns about ceding this much 
unilateral control to the State over the composition of the jury. As Justice 
González’s opinion itself reinforces, trial judges exercise substantial 
discretion over voir dire and challenges for cause.158 The judiciary, of 
course, includes many fair-minded jurists who would exercise this 
discretion patiently and with the best intentions to secure a fair trial for the 
defendant, but that benevolence would be lost with the judges who are not 
so fair-minded to the criminal defendant. In addition, any experienced trial 
lawyer can tell stories about trial judges who have exerted a heavy hand in 
controlling jury selection, maybe just for the sake of efficiency or perhaps 
for a preferred jury composition, against which only the peremptory 
challenge can defend.159 
Moreover, even the most fair-minded judge can suffer from implicit 
biases—a human affliction that also influences judicial decision-
making.160 If we acknowledge that voir dire and challenges for cause are 
 
simple review of campaign videos on YouTube for judges in partisan judicial 
election states, such as Alabama, offers some colorful examples. See Content 
Creative Media, Judge Sarah Stewart, Alabama Supreme Court – “Matters,” 
YOUTUBE (Jan. 17, 2019), https://youtu.be/0cx04p4rzqA [https://perma.cc/GX 
Q4-PX3F] (portraying candidate as a pro-Trump judge who will “guard our nation 
against evil-doers”); Strategic Impact, GREG SHAW: TRUMP TOUGH, 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 17, 2020), https://youtu.be/OYOJxATAva8 [https://perma.cc/ 
Q98R-35BZ]. 
 156. Cf. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) 
(setting ethical responsibilities for candidates for appointment to judicial office). 
 157. See supra notes 15–17, 81, and 142.  
 158. See supra note 115.  
 159. Cf. Henderson, supra note 56; Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 1, 54 (1994) (noting the importance of peremptory challenge for 
lawyers to address jury bias, despite and even in the face of judicial inquiry). 
 160. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (referring to “[a] judge’s own conscious or unconscious racism”); 
State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 343 (Iowa 2019) (Appel, J., concurring) (“[A]ll 
of us—judges, lawyers, legislators, and jurors—have unconscious or implicit 
biases”); Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, 102 ILL. B.J. 40, 42–43 
(2014) (noting role of implicit bias in all courtroom actors, including judges who, 
“like everyone else, harbor their own set of implicit biases, shaped by their life 




highly discretionary decisions by trial judges to which appellate courts will 
defer,161 we should maintain an independent bias check to prevent the trial 
judge from skewing jury selection, even unintentionally. However, many 
of the calls to eliminate peremptory challenges by lawyers appear to imply 
superior judicial neutrality in selecting jurors, who themselves also are 
presumptively unbiased, including on matters such as race and gender.162 
That neutrality is not realistic or supported.163 For example, studies on 
racial disparities in jury selection are not much friendlier to the bench than 
they are to the bar.164 Studies similarly show how upcoming elections or 
 
experiences and identity”); Bennett, supra note 33, at 157–58 (reviewing studies 
demonstrating judicial implicit bias, including racial bias, because “judges rely 
heavily on intuitive faculties when deciding traditional problems from the 
bench”); cf. LETTER OF WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT TO THE JUDICIARY AND 
LEGAL COMMUNITY (June 4, 2020), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/public 
Upload/Supreme%20Court%20News/Judiciary%20Legal%20Community%20SI
GNED%20060420.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMT6-K8CC] (acknowledging both 
“conscious and unconscious biases” in the judiciary as part of the court’s 
commitment to “achieving justice by ending racism”). 
 161. See supra note 61. 
 162. Cf. City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1134 (Wash. 2017) (Yu, 
J., concurring) (advocating that law should presume that all prospective jurors are 
“qualified” unless proven otherwise by a challenge for cause); State v. Saintcalle, 
309 P.3d 326, 369 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) (deferring to judicial 
discretion and control in supervising voir dire and ruling on challenges for cause 
and describing rulings on challenge for cause as discernibly “objective”). 
 163. Cf. Nugent, supra note 159, at 5 (observing that through “blind faith in 
their impartiality . . . judges may gain a false sense of confidence in their 
decisions”).  
 164. See Frampton, supra note 70, at 790 (discussing research that revealed 
that “through challenges for cause . . . prosecutors allege (and judges confirm) 
that black jurors remain less ‘qualified’ than white jurors to participate in an 
institution frequently touted as central to American democracy”); Wright, Chavis 
& Parks, supra note 28, at 1426, 1430 (reporting empirical study of jury selection 
practices, finding that “[t]he data show that judges removed nonwhite jurors at a 
higher rate than they did for white jurors,” and inferring, inter alia, that “[t]he 
higher rate of judicial removals for cause for nonwhite jurors might also reveal 
how judges align themselves with prosecutors, and respond more favorably to 
their requested removals for cause”). A recent survey by the National Judicial 
College happily reported that “65 percent of the 634 judges who responded 
answered yes to the question, ‘Do you believe that systemic racism exists in the 
criminal justice system?’” See Anna-Leigh Firth, Most judges believe the criminal 
justice system suffers from racism,” NAT’L JUD. C. (July 14, 2020), 
https://www.judges.org/news-and-info/most-judges-believe-the-criminal-justice-
system-suffers-from-racism/ [https://perma.cc/TBQ6-Y4MM]. This story, 




appointment decisions can influence judicial decision-making, especially 
in the area of criminal law.165 In the adversarial system, a party who 
intimately knows the theory of the case and the strengths and weaknesses 
of evidence might serve as an effective ballast to other biases influencing 
the jury’s composition, including the judge’s own.166 
The peremptory challenge thus offers a critical virtue in criminal 
cases: it reinforces the jury’s independence by preventing the State, 
intentionally or unintentionally, from stacking the deck.167 If a central 
function of an impartial lay jury is to serve as an independent community 
check on governmental power,168 one should not expect state-dominated 
jury selection to be nearly as effective at producing an independent group. 
If anyone will look for independent jurors, the criminal defendant will be 
most on the hunt for that independence as the person the State desires to 
 
however, thus also implicitly reports that about 222 of the 634 judges who were 
surveyed do not believe that systemic racism exists in the criminal justice system. 
These judges supervise jury selection, too. 
 165. See Kate Berry, How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases, 
BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/how-judicial-elections-impact-criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/L32F-LF 
HH] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020).  
 166. At a minimum, I question any legal regime that presumes a lack of bias 
from judges and jurors but presumes bias from lawyers. An adversarial approach 
to jury selection instead would presume that all the participants are vulnerable to 
bias, and they are each responsible for checking each other’s biases. 
 167. Cf. Nugent, supra note 159, at 49 (noting the role of the jury as “the best 
means of protecting against the operation of the individual biases of judges”). 
Nevertheless, in my career, I have heard several judges claim, in one form or 
another, “We could work with the first twelve in the box.” Cf. Erikson, 398 P.3d 
at 1133 (Yu, J., concurring) (arguing that “[w]e should assume that all members 
of the public who adhere to a summons to appear for jury service are qualified to 
hear a case unless otherwise shown”). By contrast, I more rarely recall prosecutors 
offering this perspective, and I cannot recall any experienced criminal defense 
lawyer endorsing it, nor any civil rights lawyer, nor for that matter many 
plaintiffs’ lawyers. Some evidence may reinforce my experiential anecdotes. See 
Montoya, supra note 73, at 998–1003 (reporting a survey of San Diego trial 
lawyers, who consistently endorsed the value of the peremptory challenge). We 
should consider why these specific groups of party interests so often align in 
caring about the peremptory challenge. Outside of the prosecutors, these parties 
tend not to be the powerbrokers of social oppression, and more often, are on the 
receiving end of it. 
 168. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; cf. Jenny Carroll, The Jury as 
Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 829 (2014) (noting that a jury can “serve as a 
forum for citizens to realign their own allegiances as they attempt to apply the law 
to the defendant”). 




convict. The peremptory challenge does not give the defendant the 
dominant voice, or even the last word, on the jury’s composition, but with 
the peremptory challenge, the State lacks the last word. Lawyers thus 
know that the jury is impartial, not because the judge says so, or because 
a party says so, but because the adversarial process shows as much.169 
Justice González emphasized, however, that lawyers may not be 
nearly as accurate in using peremptory challenges for this adversarial 
purpose as they think.170 Of course, peremptory strikes are not a bullseye 
practice, and Justice González’s opinion raises legitimate questions about 
their efficacy, even in the hands of experienced and well-resourced 
lawyers.171 Even if this efficacy claim is accurate as an empirical matter, 
 
 169. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (emphasizing 
the importance of adversarial testing to judicial determinations of constitutionally 
required standards for a criminal conviction under the Sixth Amendment). 
 170. See State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 363 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., 
concurring) (asserting that “peremptory challenges are generally ineffective even 
for the adversarial purpose of excluding unfavorable jurors”). 
 171. More comprehensive research that fully measures lawyers’ use of the 
strike might be warranted to support this empirical conclusion. Trial lawyers 
deploy peremptory challenges for a diverse range of reasons that are not constant 
from trial to trial, or even from juror to juror. The strike, for example, might seek 
to eliminate juror six, or it might seek to include juror seven by removing juror 
six, or it might simply tolerate juror seven to eliminate juror six, or it might serve 
to placate a nervous client or seek demographic balance, life experiences, 
communication or listening skills in the jury, or many other purposes. Sometimes, 
the strike simply preserves a challenge-for-cause claim on appeal. Justice 
González takes the position that many of these purposes have “nothing to do with 
furthering impartiality in our justice system,” Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 363 
(González, J., concurring). Perhaps the concept of impartiality itself is the real 
point of disagreement, although I do agree that emerging empirical research will 
be important to the ultimate fate of the peremptory challenge. The Jury Sunshine 
Project is an important example. See JURY SUNSHINE PROJECT, http://news 
.law.wfu.edu/tag/jury-sunshine-project/ [https://perma.cc/8WWX-KXGB] (last 
visited June 1, 2020). Researchers from this project have been awarded a grant to 
research whether peremptory challenges improve jury impartiality, or instead 
increase bias. See Award Abstract #1628538: Do Peremptory Challenges 
Increase Bias on Juries?, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, https://www 
.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1628538 [https://perma.cc/7MUW 
-FCXS] (last visited June 4, 2020) (proposed research in Minnesota courts to “test 
empirically the common assumption that peremptory challenges increase the 
impartiality of juries”); cf. Catherine Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Call to 
Criminal Courts: Record Rules for Batson, 105 KY. L.J. 651, 662 (2017) 
(emphasizing responsibility of local courts to preserve and share jury selection 
data for researchers in the pursuit of mitigating racial disparities in jury selection). 




the peremptory challenge still contributes an important virtue: legitimacy. 
The community accepts most criminal verdicts, even some of the most 
difficult and controversial, because they are not imposed unilaterally by 
agents of the state.172 To the contrary, an adversarial process in which 
every participant had a voice chose the members of that community to 
validate the State’s accusation. State-dominated jury selection may 
diminish confidence that jury verdicts maintain the independence from 
State control that animates the commitment to a lay jury system in the first 
place.173 
On a more local level, I cannot count the times I have exercised a 
peremptory challenge against a juror who exhibited legal “impartiality” 
like a pro during voir dire, because my client nevertheless feared the 
juror—maybe due to a background in law enforcement or other 
government position, an experience as a victim of crime, or another 
personal experience that triggered my client. When we were able to 
eliminate some of these jurors, my client and my client’s family and loved 
ones were more consistently open to accepting the jury’s decision as 
legitimate because my client had a say in the group that decided his or her 
fate. This virtue of the peremptory strike accrued even if we were to deem 
the strike inefficacious in terms of narrowly defined “impartiality.” 
Participation and perception matter to fairness.174 
 
 172. Cf. Wright, Chavis & Parks, supra note 28, at 1431 (noting that “[j]ury 
service creates a forum for popular participation criminal justice” and that “with 
other more ‘favored’ people issuing the verdicts, the legitimacy of the system 
suffers”). 
 173. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 174. Cf. JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, 
ART, AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY 271 (2d ed. 1990) (identifying the value 
of the challenge in that the parties “consequently are more likely to be accepting 
of the verdict”). But cf. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 351, 365 (González, J., concurring) 
(rejecting this party-centric concern, but acknowledging the value of the 
“appearance of a fairness”). Professor Akhil Reed Amar also has argued against 
this party-centric role of peremptory challenges as anti-democratic: “Juries should 
represent the people, not the parties.” Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten 
Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1182–83 (1995). Professor 
Amar, however, focused on a fair cross-section of the community as key to a 
representative jury. See id. at 1182. The fair cross-section responsibility of the 
State does ensure that the trial jury in its selection will draw upon a representative 
group from the local community. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359–60 
(1979) (applying a fair-cross section requirement to invalidate the opt-out rule for 
prospective women jurors). The parties, however, have a direct interest in the 
jury’s final deliberation and decision, and the peremptory challenge only 
marginally reshapes the fair cross-section into a case-specific deliberative group. 




These observations are not to say that the peremptory challenge itself 
is an indispensable part of a fair trial or that critics do not make a strong 
point. The case against the peremptory challenge is formidable. Rather, 
the claim is that the peremptory challenge offers virtues in an adversarial, 
lay-juror system beyond narrow, judicially controlled conceptions of 
impartiality. Fair trial rules should not restrict themselves to best-case 
scenarios of jury pool demographics and judicial jury selection practices. 
The law also should account for the common and even worst-case 
scenarios that place countless defendants at a disadvantage in securing 
impartial and independent jurors. Before abandoning peremptory 
challenges, therefore, the legal system should consider other mechanisms 
that also could prevent jury selection from becoming a judge-dominated 
formality that presumes a lack of bias from everyone except the parties. 
One intriguing possibility for making the loss of the peremptory 
challenge more palatable would be the expansion of voir dire to enhance 
the challenge-for-cause system. For example, Washington Supreme Court 
Justice Mary Yu has endorsed elimination of the peremptory challenge, 
but she also has noted, “Because jury selection is such an important part 
of trial, it may be time for us to require that counsel be afforded ample 
time for thoughtful questioning of prospective jurors . . . .”175 With this 
added reform to jury selection, peremptory challenges might lose their 
import. Robust voir dire that permits the parties to directly engage all of 
the prospective jurors, and not just the strategic few permitted by the 
judge’s voir dire stopwatch, would permit much more evidence-based 
advocacy on juror qualifications.176 Another helpful change involves 
adding a less deferential standard of appellate review for challenges for 
cause as a necessary feature to ensure that judges cannot unilaterally 
 
This feature seems like a modest, and reasonable, accommodation to 
representative democracy for a criminal defendant to have a voice in his or her 
own jury of “peers.” 
 175. City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1134 (Wash. 2017) (Yu., J., 
concurring); see also State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467, (Wash. 2018) (Yu, J., 
concurring) (calling for “complete abolishment of the peremptory challenge, 
coupled with further development of our ‘for cause’ challenge jurisprudence”). 
Justice González joined Justice Yu’s concurring opinions in Erickson and 
Jefferson. 
 176. Cf. Bennett, supra note 33, at 151 (asserting that “[t]he implicit bias of 
jurors can be better addressed by increased lawyer participation in voir dire, while 
the implicit bias of lawyers can then be curbed by eliminating peremptory strikes 
and only allowing strikes for cause”). 




dominate the jury selection process.177 A more robust record of juror voir 
dire should enable less deferential appellate review. 
Voir dire reform, however, would need to happen simultaneously with 
the elimination of the peremptory challenge. Further, the voir dire reform 
would need to have appellate teeth to enforce it, not just a gentle 
recommendation of “best practices” to complement a stern elimination of 
peremptories. Otherwise, one might expect from experience that the 
elimination of the peremptory challenge would have the opposite effect on 
voir dire. Under current law, the peremptory challenge empowers more 
lawyer voir dire, because judicial voir dire alone typically does not 
provide the grist that lawyers need to exercise peremptory challenges 
intelligently.178 Elimination of the peremptory challenge thus could justify 
curtailment of voir dire. At the same time, trial judges are often very 
concerned with time and efficiency, and some judges view jury selection 
as a burdensome sideshow, especially if they are skeptical about the role 
of lawyer advocacy in selecting the jury.179 If trial judges are left without 
peremptory challenges and no enforceable directives to enhance voir dire, 
 
 177. Cf. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 352 (González, J., concurring) (extolling 
deference to trial judge’s challenge for cause determinations); cf. Frampton, supra 
note 70, at 791 (calling for more robust judicial review of challenge-for-cause 
system).  
 178. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (noting 
that the purpose of voir dire is both to inform challenges for cause and to permit 
intelligent peremptory challenges); Williams, supra note 61, at 45–46 (observing 
that “the relationship between attorney participation in jury voir dire and attorneys 
being able to exercise peremptory strikes is positive, not inverse. Jury voir dire 
aids the parties in exercising peremptory strikes”). 
 179. This judicial skepticism is not always off-base, as not all lawyers train 
and prepare for voir dire meaningfully, but many lawyers do in a way that makes 
a real difference. For example, I handled a federal appeal a few year ago in an 
“alien-in-possession” firearm case that another lawyer had tried to a jury. See 18 
U.S.C. § 924(g)(5)(a) (2018). After judicial voir dire, the lawyers were not 
successful with any challenges for cause, and the record fully supported that 
outcome. The defense lawyer would have needed to be active with peremptory 
challenges to remove anyone. This federal judge, however, allowed the lawyer 
some time to voir dire the jury directly. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(2)(A) 
(permitting lawyer voir dire at judicial discretion). Due to the nature of the case, 
the lawyer focused extensively but sensitively on immigration and race with 
individual jurors. Within a short time, the lawyer had laid a foundation for five 
successful challenges for cause to which the prosecutor could not credibly object. 
My reading of this record reaffirmed my confidence in the value of zealous 
advocacy in jury selection, and my concern that, without it, judge-dominated jury 
selection does not as effectively reach juror bias. 




one should expect less, not more, voir dire in many, if not the majority, of 
cases. This dynamic would only amplify concerns about judge-dominated 
jury selection, and likely would relegate jury selection to a bureaucratic 
exercise. In the alternative, an enforceable rule to enhance voir dire with 
robust judicial review of challenges for cause could be an effective offset 
to the loss of peremptory challenges. 
In the meantime, however, gentle skepticism may be warranted before 
the law concludes that criminal defendants and other vulnerable or 
marginalized litigants should lose the virtues of the peremptory challenge 
altogether. At the same time, Justice González and other critics have 
indisputably demonstrated the vices of these challenges, and that the 
parties’ right to advocate their position zealously cannot extend to 
invidious discrimination against jurors. A fair jury selection system 
demands an effective mechanism for judges to police discriminatory 
peremptory challenges. Batson has not adequately accomplished this 
objective, for all of the reasons that critics cite. Washington’s GR 37, 
however, may provide lagom the law needs.180 At the least, GR 37 merits 
extended study before resorting to complete abandonment of the 
peremptory challenge. 
IV. CONFRONTING THE BIAS DICHOTOMY . . . AGAIN:  
WASHINGTON GR 37 
The preceding sections of this Article may seem like extended 
prologue for the main event: an endorsement of Washington’s GR 37, a 
rule that materially reframes the Batson test in regulating peremptory 
challenges.181 This endorsement, however, should be taken in a specific 
context: not as a pit stop on a journey to the peremptory challenge’s 
necessary demise, but rather, as mobilizing a response to Saintcalle’s 
persuasive call for action. Instead of bluntly eliminating the peremptory 
challenge even for criminal defendants, the law should more effectively 
address lawyer bias in jury selection without wholly sacrificing the virtues 
 
 180. See Thomas Oppong, Lagom: How the Swedish Philosophy for Living a 
Balanced, Happy Life Can Help You Live a Meaningful Life, MEDIUM (Jan. 31, 
2018), https://medium.com/thrive-global/lagom-the-swedish-philosophy-for-liv 
ing-a-happy-life-might-just-help-you-live-a-more-balanced-and-9bed612b4f7c  
(“It means ‘Not too little. Not too much. Just right.’”). 
 181. GR 37 is available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/pdf/GR/ 
GA_GR_37_00_00.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU4F-FLR4].  




of the peremptory challenge in securing an impartial jury in the adversarial 
system. GR 37’s legislative history reinforces this perspective.182 
As an initial matter, GR 37 is neither legislation that reframes the 
Batson rule, nor a judicial decision, but rather an administrative court rule. 
The Washington Supreme Court has a history of using its administrative-
rule-making authority to influence the administration of justice in that 
state.183 For example, the Washington Supreme Court established by 
administrative court rule Washington’s influential, and controversial, 
Limited License Legal Technician Program.184 The court also codified 
Washington’s Indigent Defense Standards by administrative court rule.185 
GR 37 might be the administrative rule that saves the peremptory 
challenge from another administrative rule to kill it.186 
 
 182. For a thorough examination of the legislative history of GR 37 with 
excellent sourcing to original documents and participant interviews, see Annie 
Sloan, Note, What To Do About Batson?: Using a Court Rule to Address Implicit 
Bias in Jury Selection, 108 CA. L. REV. 233 (2020). See id. at 246 n.88 (noting 
from telephone interviews with public defenders and civil plaintiff’s lawyers that 
Saintcalle was a “call of arms to protect our right to a peremptory challenge”). 
 183. See Justice Mary I. Yu, How Injustice and Inequality Have Been 
Addressed (and Sometimes Ignored) by the Washington Supreme Court, 54 GONZ. 
L. REV. 155, 163–64 (2018) (noting that “[o]ur State Supreme Court plays an 
affirmative role in trying to address injustice through our administrative work,” 
and “we are also actively engaged in promoting justice through the promulgation 
of court rules”). See generally WASH. CT. GEN. R. 9 (detailing expansive authority 
and procedures for Washington State Supreme Court rule-making). 
 184. See WASH. ADM’N. & PRAC. R. 28; Appendix R. 28. For a detailed review 
of Washington’s adoption of the Limited License Legal Technician (LLLT) 
program, see Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal 
Technician Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. 75 
(2013). To the surprise of many access-to-justice advocates, the Washington 
Supreme Court “sunset” the LLLT program on June 4, 2020. Licensed LLLTs and 
LLLT candidates who are licensed by July 31, 2020, can maintain this practice 
authority. But “[n]o new LLLTs will be admitted after that date.” Colin Rigley, 
Limited License Legal Technician Program Under the Lens, NWSIDEBAR (June 
8, 2020), https://nwsidebar.wsba.org/2020/06/01/limited-license-legal-technician 
-program-under-the-lens/ [https://perma.cc/U39N-BBZ3]. The decision prompted 
a vigorous dissent letter from Justice Barbara Madsen, who had been chief justice 
when the LLLT was adopted and who had spoken and written about the rule 
nationally. See id. 
 185. See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.1 Appendix A (2020). 
 186. See State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 338–39 (Wash. 2013) (noting that 
“as both we and Justice González’s concurring opinion note, it might be more 
appropriate to consider whether to abolish peremptory challenges through the 
rule-making process instead of in the context of a specific case”). 




GR 37 as a proposal, however, did not originate in an administrative 
committee of the Washington Supreme Court. Rather, the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Washington initially proposed this rule as an 
opportunity “to protect Washington jury trials from intentional or 
unintentional, unconscious, or institutional bias in the empanelment of 
juries.”187 Although this proposal championed Saintcalle’s valid concerns 
over racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges, implicit in 
this same proposal was the preservation of the peremptory challenge.188 
The proposed solution instead was “progressive reform” of the Batson 
framework for regulating these challenges.189 
The twin goals of this proposal were to lower the threshold for an 
improper peremptory strike from Batson’s intent-dependent test, and to 
modify the Batson procedure to lessen the opportunity for lawyer 
stratagem or implicit bias to thwart effective judicial review.190 The 
proposal thus was framed around an “objective observer” test that would 
judge the propriety of a challenged peremptory strike: “If the court 
determines that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a 
factor for the peremptory challenge, the challenge shall be denied.”191 This 
standard would apply to all jury trials, criminal and civil.192 Moreover, the 
proposal included commentary that identified several common “race-
neutral” explanations for peremptory challenges as having “historically 
been used to perpetuate exclusion of minority jurors.”193 The proposal thus 
established specific considerations and even presumptions that judges 
would need to apply in evaluating these race-neutral explanations by 
lawyers.194 
In the months that followed, this proposal spurred an intensive debate 
with public meetings, public comments, and counter-proposals.195 
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Criminal defense lawyers generally supported the rule,196 as did affinity 
bar groups197 and social justice organizations.198 Prosecutors, however, 
uniformly opposed the rule,199 and submitted a counter-proposal that 
effectively codified Batson with some modifications to voir dire 
practices.200 Other feedback supported the rule in principle but quarreled 
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LS-G38J]. See also State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467, 477 (Wash. 2018) 
(summarizing legislative history of GR 37). The proposal also received significant 
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Comments on GR 36, KING CNTY. DEP’T PUB. DEF. (May 1, 2017), https:// 
www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/Anita%20Khandelw
al.pdf (supporting proposal on behalf of public defense office). 
 197. See Chalia Stallings-Alai-ilima, Proposed New General Rule 36 – Jury 
Selection, LOREN MILLER BAR ASS’N (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.courts.wa 
.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/Chalia%20Stallings-Ala-ilima.pdf  
(supporting proposal); David Perez, Proposed General Rule 36, LATINO/A BAR 
ASS’N WASH. (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed 
/2016Nov/GR36/David%20A.%20Perez.pdf (supporting proposal); Alexandro 
Kirigin, Proposed New General Rule 36 – Jury Selection, PIERCE CNTY. 
MINORITY BAR ASS’N (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_ 
Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/Alexandro%20Kirigin%20-%20PCMBA.pdf  
(supporting proposal); Andrea Chin, Letter, ASIAN BAR ASS’N WASH. (Apr. 28, 
2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/Andre 
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 198. See Robert S. Chang et al., Proposed General Rule 36, KOREMATSU CTR. 
L. & EQUAL. SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. L. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/ 
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 199. See Rich Weyrich, Proposed Rule GR 36, WASH. ASS’N PROSECUTING 
ATT’YS (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016 
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WAPA Letter] (“The Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (WAPA) 
opposes the ACLU’s proposed rule”); John Juhl, Proposed Rule GR 36, 
SNOHOMISH CNTY. PROSECUTING ATTY (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.courts.wa 
.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/John%20J.%20Juhl.pdf (opposing 
proposal); Sloan, supra note 182, at 248 (observing that “[c]riminal prosecutors 
were the primary opponents of the ACLU proposed rule”). 
 200. See WAPA Letter, supra note 199 (inviting the Supreme Court “to adopt 
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with details, such as the omission of protection from biases against gender, 
sexual orientation, and gender identity,201 or the procedure and standards 
for judicial review of challenges.202 Law students from Gonzaga 
University even joined the conversation.203 
In response to this multitude of perspectives, the Washington Supreme 
Court commissioned a formal GR 37 Workgroup from representative 
stakeholders, including civil practitioners, criminal defense lawyers, 
prosecutors, other members of the legal community, administrators, and 
members of the judiciary.204 The Workgroup labored for several months, 
 
peremptory challenges”); Sloan, supra note 182, at 248–50 (describing WAPA 
proposal). 
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 202. See Dominic Bacetich & Peter Meyers, GR 36 Proposal, WASH. STATE 
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.pdf (questioning the absence of gender and critiquing the procedure and 
standards). 
 203. This proposal was pending when I taught my Spring 2017 course, 
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significant time studying Batson jurisprudence, including the Saintcalle decision. 
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workgroups who separately analyzed and commented on the proposal. See 
Interview with Students, Gonzaga University School of Law, in Spokane, Wash. 
(Apr. 17, 2017). As I noted in my cover letter accompanying the student 
workgroup submissions, “These comments . . . offer a small sample of the 
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after studying the issues.” Id. These student workgroup comments are insightful, 
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proposal. Id. 
 204. See Lila J. Silverstein et al., Proposed New GR-37—Jury Selection 
Workgroup: FINAL REPORT, at 1, 15–16 (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.courts 
.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/OrderNo25700-A-
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soliciting additional input from numerous other stakeholders.205 The 
Workgroup Final Report captures this process206 and highlights several 
points of unresolved disagreement.207 An important point of the 
Workgroup consensus, however, addressed the peremptory challenge 
itself: “Workgroup members discussed the idea of eliminating peremptory 
challenges and concluded that they are still useful as long as they are not 
based on the race or ethnicity of potential jurors.”208 
The Workgroup Final Report thus submitted four major 
recommendations to the Washington Supreme Court: (1) adopt the 
proposed jury selection court rule to address racial discrimination in 
peremptory challenges; (2) review how the rule can be expanded to include 
gender and sexual orientation; (3) require education sessions for judges on 
implementing the new rule, preferably prior to its effective date; and (4) 
create a manual of “best practices” for jury selection under this new rule.209 
The Workgroup Final Report concluded with these observations: 
Collectively, members agree that a general court rule is the best 
vehicle to address the discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges during jury selection. The workgroup’s proposed rule 
is intended to shift the burden to the striking party to prove a race-
neutral basis for the challenge, instead of the current standard that 
requires a judge to make sometimes subjective determinations 
about the motivations of a peremptory challenge.210 
In April of 2018, the Washington Supreme Court accepted the 
Workgroup’s core recommendation and adopted GR 37.211 This rule is a 
watershed development: it not only meaningfully regulates peremptory 
challenges, but also preserves the fundamental virtues of these challenges. 
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The rule applies to all jury trials212 and is meant  “to eliminate the unfair 
exclusion of potential jurors on race or ethnicity.”213 The rule further 
authorizes any party, or the court on its own motion, to object to a 
peremptory challenge as improper under the rule.214 These features of GR 
37 smack of basic Batson jurisprudence. The major reforms to Batson 
codified in GR 37, however, include the following: 
1. The rule eliminates Batson’s clunky three-stage, prima facie 
test once a party objects to a challenge. Instead, upon 
objection, “the party exercising the peremptory challenge 
shall articulate the reasons that the peremptory challenge has 
been exercised.”215 
2. In evaluating the objection and response, the trial judge no 
longer evaluates whether the striking party engaged in 
purposeful discrimination sufficient for an equal protection 
violation. Rather, the trial judge examines the totality of 
circumstances to determine whether “an objective observer 
could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the 
peremptory challenge.”216 The “objective observer,” 
moreover, is defined as an “observer [who] is aware that 
implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in addition to 
purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair 
exclusion of potential jurors in Washington State.”217 
3. The rule invites judges to consider a range of evidence in 
assessing whether race could be a factor in the challenged 
strike, including traditional comparative evidence.218 The rule, 
however, expressly defines certain race-neutral explanations as 
“presumptively” invalid, because they “have been associated 
with improper discrimination in jury selection in Washington 
State.”219 Moreover, associating several other common 
justifications for strikes with improper discrimination, the rule 
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requires the party offering that justification to give notice so the 
court and opposing party can verify that information.220 The 
judge or opposing lawyer’s inability to verify this basis for the 
strike “shall invalidate the reason given for the peremptory 
challenge.”221 
GR 37 thus uniquely invites judges to critically examine peremptory 
challenges for implicit bias as well as explicit bias. In this assessment, the 
judge will consider the history of racial bias, individually and structurally, 
in the system of jury selection. Further, the rule does not excuse biased 
strikes that may co-exist with mixed motives not relating to race.222 Also, 
the objecting lawyer no longer must effectively accuse opposing counsel 
of intentional racial discrimination. Rather, the responding lawyer must be 
persuasive based on the evidentiary record in defending the peremptory 
strike against the claim of objective bias. Resort to tired cliché or 
unsupported rationales will result in the juror being reseated. These 
reforms thus open a rich, new, objective field for judicial review of 
peremptory challenges that may limit their vices. Yet, these reforms also 
still draw on the adversarial process and lawyer advocacy to challenge and 
defend these independent strikes from parties as the primary process for 
achieving an impartial jury. 
GR 37, however, does exclude some important details. First, the rule 
is limited to racial bias in the use of peremptory strikes. Claims of bias 
implicating gender, sexual orientation, or other protected classifications 
presumably still will be decided under the traditional Batson test. Trial 
judges thus may have to shuffle between two different tests during jury 
selection—GR 37 for race and Batson for everything else. This analysis 
could be especially complicated when challenges to individual jurors 
involve claims of intersectional bias, implicating, for instance, race and 
gender.223 Perhaps the Washington Supreme Court will revisit this 
exclusion, which the Workgroup Final Report recommended.224 
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Second, GR 37 establishes no remedy for erroneous applications of 
the rule by trial judges. The rule does not even identify an appellate 
standard of review for these decisions. As an administrative rule, GR 37 
does not draw naturally on pre-existing constitutional standards. The 
Washington Supreme Court, however, decided to leave these questions for 
another day. Nevertheless, lawyers, trial judges, and especially 
intermediate appellate courts need this insight in short order as practice 
develops around GR 37. 
The Washington Supreme Court provided critical insight into GR 37 
in State v. Jefferson.225 This case presented a Batson claim, yet GR 37 was 
adopted after Jefferson’s jury trial.226 The court, therefore, concluded that 
it could not apply GR 37 retroactively to Jefferson’s jury selection.227 The 
court, however, reaffirmed that “Batson has failed to eliminate race 
discrimination in jury selection.”228 The court consequently decided that 
the Batson test “must be modified in order to prevent discrimination in 
jury selection.”229 The court thus substituted GR 37’s “objective observer” 
standard for stage three of Batson’s analysis, the purposeful discrimination 
prong.230 This inquiry includes GR 37’s definition of the objective 
observer as “a person who is aware of the history of explicit race 
discrimination in America and aware of how that impacts our current 
decision making in nonexplicit, or implicit, unstated, ways.”231 The court 
further announced that the standard of appellate review on this “objective 
observer” question is not deferential at all, but rather de novo.232 In the 
end, this importation of GR 37 into Batson sent a potentially strong 
message, because the court concluded Jefferson failed to establish a 
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traditional Batson violation, but did establish a GR 37 violation.233 The 
resulting message to lawyers and trial judges: GR 37 means business. 
This combination of GR 37 and Jefferson thus positioned Washington 
as an exciting incubator for Batson reform while preserving the 
peremptory challenge.234 Other state courts and advocates outside of 
Washington have noticed and are exploring the potential for similar 
reform, drawing on Washington’s model.235 The path forward, however, 
will be extremely important for determining whether GR 37 truly 
empowers the law to confront the bias dichotomy in jury selection or 
simply serves as a symbolic but ineffectual iteration of the Batson 
regime.236 To maximize the opportunity for GR 37 to meet its goals, some 
forward-looking considerations are important. 
CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD 
GR 37 preserves the peremptory challenge but creates almost a soft, 
reverse challenge for cause if an opposing party or a trial judge is 
concerned that the peremptory strike implicates racial bias. GR 37 thus 
arms the parties and the trial judge with much more effective means for 
policing racial discrimination in peremptory challenges, in all its forms, 
explicit and implicit, while still permitting the parties to have a direct voice 
in the jury’s impartiality. So long as the challenge is not objectively based 
on race, the State’s permission is not needed to exercise it. 
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The significant reforms that GR 37 may accomplish could extend to 
voir dire itself, without the need for a new court rule. For lawyers and 
judges to anticipate, argue, and evaluate GR 37 claims, they will need to 
approach jury selection thoughtfully and sensitively, building an evidence-
based, credible record for why lawyers struck jurors for party-centric 
concerns over impartiality that are rooted in more than just hunch and 
intuition.237 Jefferson’s standard of de novo review may reinforce the need 
for judges to permit and even encourage this engaged approach to voir dire 
across both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.238 
An engaged, evidence-based approach to voir dire and GR 37 
determinations will not succeed, however, without training, training, and 
more training.239 These programs should extend at a minimum to training 
in implicit bias, training in effective voir dire techniques, training in how 
to argue and analyze GR 37 claims, and even cultural training within 
courthouses and law offices.240 This kind of training, importantly, is still 
client-centric for zealous advocates, because it helps lawyers more 
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accurately identify real, evidence-based concerns for juror bias. Untrained 
shots in the dark, by contrast, less often advance the client’s cause.241 
This training could even extend to the jurors themselves. For instance, 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington 
shows prospective jurors an educational video on implicit bias that jurors 
will bring with them into the voir dire process.242 Western District judges 
also give jurors a number of legal instructions on implicit bias, including, 
when requested, instructions prior to voir dire.243 If the goal of GR 37 is 
to reduce the influence of invidious biases in jury selection, including 
implicit biases, then engaging the jury itself on this issue might further that 
goal. With all of these practices under GR 37, lawyers may achieve far 
more good than when they solely “rely on intuition, lore, and anecdotal 
experience in exercising peremptory challenges.”244 
Scholars also should measure GR 37 with reliable, extensive research 
to see whether it is achieving reduced racial bias, increased jury diversity 
and independence, and effective use of the peremptory challenge by 
advocates. Some of this research has started already. For instance, a 
student researcher has gathered interview data from lawyers in 
Washington about the early impact of GR 37.245 Initial observations 
included that “lawyers have become hesitant to strike jurors of color,”246 
and “an increase in objections to peremptory challenges.”247 One 
Washington public defender reported to this student that, post-GR 37, 
“‘prosecutors are not striking anyone who is visibly of color.’”248  
Another scholar has considered GR 37 in the context of a five-year 
field study of jury selection practices by Assistant United States 
Attorneys.249 This scholar observed that “GR 37 is likely to impact 
prosecutors’ behavior . . . in unpredictable ways.”250 The author explained 
to illustrate this point:  
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Prosecutors who view the rarity of successful Batson challenges 
as reason to question their relevance may find reason to more 
meaningfully alter their behavior if an effect of GR 37 is to make 
challenges more prevalent and easily won. This development 
might amplify Batson’s deterrent potential by bringing the stakes 
of violations into view.251  
At the same time, the rule’s “reference to ‘implicit, unconscious, and 
institutional’ bias may nevertheless undercut Batson’s deterrent effect on 
those lawyers primarily concerned with the professional and reputational 
harm of a Batson challenge.”252 
A more extensive record than a few months of experience under GR 
37 will be necessary for meaningful conclusions.253 A particularly 
important long-term research agenda could be comparative in nature, 
measuring differences in practices and outcomes between Washington and 
jurisdictions that maintain the Batson regime, plus any jurisdictions that 
may decide to eliminate or significantly reduce peremptory challenges. If 
more jurisdictions adopt iterations of Washington’s GR 37, this 
comparative research could become even more robust and illuminating. 
Research centers like the Jury Sunshine Project are already demonstrating 
rich expertise at examining jury selection patterns.254 
This research could shed determinative light on whether new models 
like GR 37 can effectively confront the intractable bias dichotomy in jury 
selection. With such a viable option to address invidious bias in jury 
selection, however, one should be cautious about jumping precipitously to 
one-sided solutions like elimination of the peremptory challenge. Instead, 
the legal community should work on extending the hopeful success of GR 
37 to other types of bias, such as gender and sexual orientation bias, within 
an adversarial jury selection process. Within this framework, perhaps the 
law better can fulfill the imperative of eliminating racism and other 
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